THE

REPORT

OF THE

GENERAL OFFICERS,

APPOINTED

By his MAJESTY's Warrant of the First of November 1757, to inquire into the Causes of the Failure of the late Expedition to the Coasts of FRANCE.

To which is prefixed,

A Copy of his MAJESTY's Warrant directing the said Inquiry.

WITH

An APPENDIX, containing the Papers referred to in the said Report.

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GEORGE R.

WHEREAS we were pleaſed, in *Auguſt* laſt, to ſend a Number of our Troops on an Expedition againſt *France*, with Orders and Inſtructions to attempt, as far as ſhould be found practicable, a Deſcent on the *French* Coaſt at or near *Rochefort*, in order to attack, if practicable, and by a vigorous Impreſſion force that Place; and to burn and deſtroy, to the utmoſt of their Power, all Docks, Magazines, Arſenals, and Shipping, that ſhould be found there; and to exert ſuch other Efforts, as ſhould be judged moſt proper for annoying the Enemy, as by our ſeveral Inſtructions to the Commander of our ſaid Forces does more fully appear: And whereas the Troops ſent for theſe Purpoſes are returned to *Great Britain*, no Attempt having been made to land on the Coaſt of *France*; concerning the Cauſes of which Failure we think it neceſſary that Enquiry ſhould be made by the General Officers herein after named, in order that they may report thoſe Cauſes to us, for our better Information: Our Will and Pleaſure therefore is, and we do hereby nominate and appoint our right Truſty and right entirely beloved Couſin and Counſellor *Charles* Duke of *Marlborough* Lieutenant General, our Truſty and well beloved *George Sackville*, commonly called Lord *George Sackville*, and *John Waldegrave*, Major Generals of our Forces, to

examine and enquire touching the Matters aforeſaid. And you are to give Notice to the ſaid General Officers, when and where they are to meet for the ſaid Examination. And the ſaid General Officers are hereby directed to cauſe you to ſummon ſuch Perſons (whether the Generals or other Officers employed in the Expedition, or others) as are neceſſary to give Information touching the ſaid Matters, or as ſhall be deſired by thoſe, who were employed in the Expedition: And the ſaid General Officers are hereby farther directed to hear ſuch Perſons as ſhall offer to give them Information touching the ſame; and they are authorized, empowered, and required, ſtrictly to examine into the Matters before mentioned, and to report a State thereof, as it ſhall appear to them, together with their Opinion thereon. All which you are to tranſmit to our Secretary at War, to be by him laid before us for our Conſideration. And for ſo doing this ſhall be, as well to you, as to our ſaid General Officers and all others concerned, a ſufficient Warrant. Given at our Court at *Kenſington* this Firſt Day of *November* 1757, in the Thirty Firſt Year of our Reign.

By his MAJESTY's Command,

BARRINGTON.

To our Truſty and well beloved *Thomas Morgan*, Eſq; Judge Advocate General of our Forces, or his Deputy.

MINUTES

OF THE

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

GENERAL OFFICERS, &c.

As annexed to their REPORT.

AT a Meeting of the General Officers appointed to inquire into the Cauſes of the Failure of the late Expedition to the Coaſt of *France*, at the Judge Advocate General's Office in *Privy Garden*, on *Saturday* the 12th of *November*, 1757, *viz.*

Lieutenant General, His Grace the Duke of *Marlborough*.
Major General, Right Honourable Lord *George Sackville*.
Major General, Honourable *John Waldegrave*.

The General Officers employed in the Expedition, *viz.* Sir *John Mordaunt*, Lieutenant General (who had the principal Command) and Majors General *Conway* and *Cornwallis* being called in, and all Perſons who were deſirous being admitted, his Majeſty's Warrant directing this Inquiry was publickly read.

Read alſo the ſeveral Papers tranſmitted to the Judge Advocate from Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, and two Orders tranſmitted from the Admiralty in conſequence of an Application from the General Officers appointed to make this Inquiry, *viz.*

1. Copy of a Letter, dated *London* 15th *July*, 1757, from Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel) *Clerk*,

to Sir *John Ligonier*, and tranſmitted to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, with regard to *Rochefort*.

2. Minute, dated *Arlington Street*, *Auguſt* 1757, containing an Examination of a *French* Pilot.

3. *Memoire ſur la Force actuelle de la* France, *et les Services auxquels elle eſt employée dans l'Année* 1757— received *July* 28, 1757, and communicated, at a Meeting at Lord *Holderneſſe*'s Houſe, to the Generals appointed on an Expedition to the Coaſts of *France*.

4. Copy of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Auguſt* 5, 1757.

5. Copy of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir *John Mordaunt*, dated *Auguſt* 5, 1757.

6. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Auguſt* 5, 1757.

7. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Major General *Conway*, Major General *Cornwallis*, Vice Admiral *Knowles*, and Rear Admiral *Brodrick*, dated *Auguſt* 5, 1757.

8. Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Spithead*, *Auguſt* 7, 1757.

9. Copy of a Letter from Major General *Cornwallis* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Newport*, *Iſle of Wight*, *Auguſt* 6, 1757.

10. Copy of a Letter from Vice Admiral *Knowles* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Portſmouth*, *Auguſt* 6, 1757.

11. Copy of a Letter from Rear Admiral *Brodrick* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Portſmouth*, *Auguſt* 6, 1757.

12. Copy of an Order from the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Auguſt* 5, 1757.

13. Copy of an Order from the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Auguſt* 6, 1757.

14. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Iſle of Wight*, *Auguſt* 11, 1757, Ten at Night.

15. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, to Sir *John Mordaunt*, dated *Auguſt* 13, 1757.

16. Copy

16. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated Head Quarters, *Newport*, *Auguſt* 20, 1757. Incloſing,

17. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to *Thomas Orby Hunter*, and *Gilbert Eliott*, Eſqrs. dated *Auguſt* 17, 1757.

18. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Auguſt* 23, 1757.

19. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Sir *John Mordaunt*, dated *Auguſt* 23, 1757. Incloſing,

20. Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Clevland* to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Auguſt* 19, 1757;

21. Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Clevland* to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Auguſt* 20, 1757;

22. Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Clevland* to Mr. *Cockburne*, dated *Auguſt* 21, 1757;

23. Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Cockburne* to Mr. *Clevland*, dated *Auguſt* 23, 1757.

24. Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Portſmouth*, *Auguſt* 25, 1757.

25. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Sir *Edward Hawke* and Sir *John Mordaunt*, dated *September* 5, 1757, Four o'Clock in the Afternoon.

26. Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Ramilies* at *Spithead*, *September* 6, 1757.

27. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Portſmouth*, *September* 6, Nine at Night.

28. Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Ramilies* at St. *Helens*, *September* 8, 1757.

29. Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Ramilies* at Sea, *September* 10, 1757.

30. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Sir *Edward Hawke* and Sir *John Mordaunt*, dated *September* 15, 1757, by the *Viper* Sloop.

The above Papers containing all the Orders and Inſtructions which appear to have been ſignified to the Commanders of the late Expedition, it was publickly aſked, Whether any Perſon had any Information to offer, tending to ſhew the Cauſes, why the ſaid Orders were not carried into execution, or why the Expedition has failed?—And any ſuch Perſon, being preſent, was deſired then to declare the ſame, in order to his withdrawing for the preſent, with Aſſurance, that he ſhould, in convenient Time, be fully heard: And no Perſon offering himſelf,

Ordered, That all Perſons ſummoned as Witneſſes, do withdraw into a Room appointed for that Purpoſe, until called for, in order to their being examined ſeparately.

Then proceeded to read other of the Papers received from Mr. Secretary *Pitt*'s Office, *viz.*

31. Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Ramilies* in *Baſque* Road, *September* 30, 1757. Incloſing,

32. Copy of a Report made to Sir *Edward Hawke* on board the *Ramilies*, *September* 24, 1757, by Rear Admiral *Brodrick* and others;

33. Copy of a Council of War held on board the *Neptune*, *September* 25, 1757; the ſame as the Original delivered by Sir *John Mordaunt*, ſoon after his Arrival, to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*;

34. Copy of a Council of War held on board the *Ramilies*, *September* 28, 1757; the ſame as the Original delivered by Sir *John Mordaunt*, ſoon after his Arrival, to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*;

35. Copy of a Letter from Rear Admiral *Brodrick* to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Achilles*, *Tueſday* Morning, One in the Morning;

36. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *Ramilies*, *Thurſday* Evening, *September* 29, 1757.

37. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Ramilies*, *Rade de Baſque*, *September* 30, 1757.

38. A Paper purporting to be Minutes of a Council of War aſſembled on board his Majeſty's Ship *Ramilies* in *Baſque* Road, the 28th of *September*, 1757, and appearing by the Indorſement to have been delivered by Sir *John Mordaunt*, ſoon after his Arrival, to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, being about to be read,

Sir *John Mordaunt* ſaid, That he did not mean to object to the reading of the ſaid Paper, but begged leave to obſerve, that the Minutes now produced, were taken down without the Knowledge of the Perſons, who compoſed the ſaid Council of War, and never ſeen by the Gentlemen, whoſe Names are thereunder written; and that the firſt Knowledge he (Sir *John Mordaunt*) had of them, was from a Copy delivered to him by Sir *Edward Hawke*'s Secretary, Mr. *Hay*, after his Arrival at *Portſmouth*. That upon ſeeing them, he attempted to prevent Sir *Edward Hawke*'s ſending them up to *London*; but his Application was too late. Sir *John Mordaunt* added, That ſome little Time after his Arrival in *London*, underſtanding that he ought, as Commander in Chief of the Land Forces, to deliver Copies of the Councils of War, and any other material Papers, to Mr. *Pitt*, his Majeſty's Secretary of State, in like Manner as Sir *Edward Hawke* had done, as Commander of the Fleet, he did ſo, and delivered the ſaid Copy of Minutes received from Sir *Edward Hawke*'s Secretary among the reſt.

Sir *John Mordaunt* being aſked, Whether at the Time of his delivering a Copy of theſe Minutes to Mr. *Pitt*, he obſerved to him, that they were not authentick?

Anſwered, He does not recollect, that he did.

Then the ſaid Minutes were read, in Preſence of the ſeveral Perſons hereafter-mentioned, Members of the ſaid Council of War, who were ſeverally called upon for their Information, Whether the ſaid Minutes are authentick, and taken down with their Privity? *viz.*

1. Vice Admiral *Charles Knowles*, who diſavowed theſe Minutes intirely, ſaying that he never ſaw them,

until

until they were ſhewn to him after his Arrival in *London*.

2. Rear Admiral *Thomas Brodrick*, who ſaid, that he did obſerve Minutes taken, and remembers he objected to it, but never ſaw theſe Minutes; and mention being therein made of Sir *John Mordaunt*'s retiring with him (Rear Admiral *Brodrick*) and others, obſerves that he remembers Sir *Edward Hawke*, Vice Admiral *Knowles*, and himſelf retiring, but does not recollect Sir *John Mordaunt*'s going out with them. ——He further ſays, that he, at the Deſire of Sir *John Mordaunt*, went off to Admiral Sir *Edward Hawke* at *Spithead*, in Hopes of preventing theſe Minutes being ſent up to *London*, but that unluckily they were ſent away before he reached the Admiral.

3. Major General *Conway*, who ſays, that to the beſt of his Memory, theſe Minutes were never communicated to him, and knows it was agreed upon not to have any Minutes taken.

4. Major General *Edward Cornwallis*, who ſays he never ſaw the Minutes in queſtion, until ſhewn to him at *Portſmouth* to his very great Surprize.

5. Colonel *George Howard*, who ſays, he never ſaw theſe Minutes till Sir *John Mordaunt* ſhewed them to him after their Arrival at *Portſmouth*.

Vice Admiral *Knowles* being, at his own Deſire, again called in, deſired to ſupply an Omiſſion in his former Evidence, *viz.* That he recollects there was a poſitive Determination, that no Minutes ſhould be taken, but that the Informations only of the Perſons examined, ſhould be noted down.

Major General *Conway* obſerved, That, as he underſtood it, not even what the Witneſſes ſaid was intended to be made publick, or to ſtand Part of the Minutes of the Council of War, ſo as to be tranſmitted to any Perſon.

Vice Admiral *Knowles* confirmed the ſame; adding, that he never heard their Examination read.

Read the Remainder of the Papers received from Mr. Secretary *Pitt*'s Office, *viz.*

39. Copy

39. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Ramilies*, *October* 4, 1757.

40. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Portſmouth*, *October* 6, 1757.

41. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Sir *Edward Hawke*, dated *October* 7, 1757.

42. Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary *Pitt* to Sir *John Mordaunt*, dated *October* 7, 1757.

43. Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Ramilies* at *Spithead*, *October* 8, 1757. One P. M.

44. Copy of a Letter from Sir *John Mordaunt* to Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, dated *Portſmouth*, *October* 8, 1757.

The ſeveral Papers tranſmitted to the Judge-Advocate, and by him laid before the Board, being read, and no Perſon offering to give them any Information touching the Cauſes of the Failure of the Expedition,

Sir *John Mordaunt*, as Commander in Chief of the Land Forces employed therein, was aſked, What have been the Reaſons, if he has no Objection to laying them before the Board, which have prevented his Majeſty's Inſtructions and Orders from being carried into Execution?

Who replied, that to prevent Trouble, and that the Matter may be the better underſtood, as his ſpeaking is attended with Difficulty, he had committed the whole to writing, from Beginning to End, and delivered to the Board a Paper, as containing the ſame, which was, at his Deſire, read in Words following, *viz.*

" In order to give all the Satisfaction in my Power, " I have reduced into Writing, the fulleſt Account of " the whole Matter I am able to give.

" When I firſt received his Majeſty's Commands " in regard to this Expedition, I was told, that the " Object of it was to make a Diverſion on the Coaſt " of *France*.

" That

" That as far as reſpected *Rochefort* in particular, " it was on the footing of a *Coup de Main*, or Sur- " prize, and that conſequently, if the Deſign was " diſcovered, or the Alarm taken, it would be next " to impoſſible to execute it.

" I alſo underſtood, that unleſs a proper Place for " the Landing, and ſafe Retreat of the Troops was " diſcovered, particularly where the Ships could pro- " tect them, and a ſafe Communication with the " Fleet, and Conveyance of Supplies from it was " ſecured, the Attempt could not be made.

" In Confirmation of which I beg leave to take " Notice of two Paragraphs in a Paper given me " upon this Occaſion by Sir *John Ligonier*, Com- " mander in Chief of his Majeſty's Land Forces, " whoſe long Experience, and great Abilities in the " Art of War, will ſurely vindicate any Officer who " is guided by ſo good an Authority; containing " his Obſervations on the intended Expedition; " which Paper, as I remember, was read before the " Council.

" The Paragraphs I mean, are as follows:"

' If an Attempt is to be made on *Rochefort*, it ' will be the Part of the Admiral, to know the Coaſts; ' to bring the Troops to the neareſt Place; to co- ' ver their Landing by the Diſpoſition of his Ships; ' and to deſtroy any Barbet Batteries which the Ene- ' my may have on the Shore; ſtill remembring, that ' if the Troops are landed at too great a Diſtance ' from the Place, the Deſign will become dangerous, ' and probably impracticable.'

" The ſecond Paragraph,"

' A ſafe and well ſecured Communication between ' the Camp and the Sea, from whence you are to re- ' ceive your Supplies of all Kinds, is abſolutely ne- ' ceſſary; the whole depends upon it; but this being ' done, I ſhould not be much in Pain for the Safety ' of the Troops; an inferior Number dares not ap- ' proach you, and one ſuperior will not be eaſily aſ-

' ſembled

' ſembled without your knowing it; and, at all ' Events, you have ſecured a Retreat to the Ships.'

" I alſo thought it clear from the State of *Rochefort*, as deſcribed by Colonel *Clerk*, and afterwards " by the *French* Pilot, that though it ſhould have remained in the ſame Condition as when they ſaw it, " which was not later than three Years paſt, yet a " few Da s Preparation would make it ſufficiently " defenſible againſt a *Coup de Main*: For which Reaſon, judging the Dependance on ſuch an Operation " alone improper, in an Expedition of this Sort, " I applied to his Majeſty's Miniſters in Council, " for two more Old Battalions, and Artillery for a " regular Attack, to force the Place, which, I " thought, from its Conſtruction, as difficult to be " made defenſible againſt a regular Attack, as it was " eaſy to ſecure it againſt an Aſſault. And although " it was not thought fitting to comply with this " Requeſt, yet his Majeſty having ordered me to " take the Command of the Expedition, upon the " Footing it was planned, I thought it my Duty to " obey; underſtanding, that my Inſtructions gave " me Latitude to act according to the beſt of my " Judgment, regarding the Circumſtances of the " Time, the Condition of the Place, and the Nature " of the Service; and where any Difficulty aroſe, or " the Importance of the Subject required it, a Power " to call a Council of War.

" Poſitive and credible Intelligence received, as " well before the Embarkation, as during the Voyage, " traced the Alarm, and the Preparations along the " *French* Coaſts, from *Breſt* and *St. Maloes* quite " down to *Rochefort*.

" A Letter from a *French* Officer ſuperintending " the Batteries near *Breſt*, to the Captain of the " *Emerald*, taken and brought into the Fleet by Captain *Gilchriſt*, deſcribes the Preparations which " had for ſome Time been making there; and that " Tr ops were not wanting on the Coaſt, there be- " ing at that Time near ſeven thouſand regular Troops

" on

" on one Side the *Breſt* Water, and more on the " other Side, beſides the Militia.

" A Letter from Captain *Clevland* declares, that " on *Wedneſday* the 17th of *Auguſt*, he ſpoke with a " *Dutch* Convoy from *Rochelle*, and that a firſt Lieu- " tenant came on board him, and told him, that the " *French* expected the *Engliſh* at *Rochelle*, but were " not alarmed.

" It was afterwards confirmed to us on the Voyage " by the Maſter of a *Dutch* Ship from *Vannes* in " *France*, to *Dort*, ſpoke with by Captain *Proby* " of his Majeſty's Ship *Medway*, on the 11th *Sep-* " *tember*; that the *French* expected to be attacked at " *Rochelle* or *St. Martins*, by the *Engliſh*: Alſo that " an Embargo was laid on all Shipping in *France*.

" After all the ſeveral Indications and Intelligences " mentioned, it was impoſſible to doubt, that there " was a general Alarm ſpread, and ſtill more ſo " to imagine, that a Place like *Rochefort*, the ſe- " cond certainly in Importance on the whole Coaſt, " ſhould, after ſuch Warning, be totally neglected.

" The Voyage being tedious, we did not make " the *French* Coaſt till the 20th of *September*, about " Noon.

" It was the 23d before we got into the Road, and " that Day made ourſelves Maſters of the Iſle of " *Aix*. The ſame Day Admiral *Brodrick*, with four " Captains, was ſent to ſound the Coaſt, and find " out a proper Landing place. The ſame Night al- " ſo the Admiral declared, that the Fort of *Fouras* " ſhould be battered; and in Conſequence of that, " ordered the Pilot of the *Magnanime* to be ſent for, " in order to be examined upon that Head, who next " Morning declared, a Ship might be brought up at " a proper Diſtance to ſilence that Fort.

" The next Morning, being the 24th, a Plan for " landing the Troops as near the Fort of *Fouras* as " poſſible, while one or more Ships battered it on the " Water-ſide, and propoſing alſo a Feint to be made " on the Side of *Rochelle*, and the Iſle of *Rhé*, was

" given

" given in by the Generals; but the Admiral not
" approving of the Feint to be made, and declaring,
" that *Fouras* could not be battered from the Sea,
" without hazard of loſing the Ship, the Admiral
" and Captains, who returned, and made the Report
" on the landing about One o'Clock alſo declaring,
" That between the Fort of *Fouras* and *Rochelle* they
" had found only two Landing-places, which were
" both near the Point of *Chatelaillon* on the open
" Bay, and where the Water was ſo ſhoal, that no
" Ships could lye up to cover the Landing, or ſe-
" cure the Retreat of the Troops: Upon theſe Con-
" ſiderations, as well as upon other Intelligence I had
" received in relation to the Place itſelf, I did, ac-
" cording to the Latitude I underſtood to be in his
" Majeſty's Inſtructions, and agreeably to the Powers
" therein given me, think it my Duty, in ſo import-
" ant and critical a Caſe, to deſire a General Council
" of War, to take into Conſideration what was pro-
" per to be done in Execution of his Majeſty's Secret
" Inſtructions. That Council, compoſed equally of
" Land and Sea Officers, having conſidered the
" Nature of the Landing on the one Hand, and
" of the Attack to be made on *Rochefort* on the
" other, the Officers were unanimouſly of opinion,
" That an Attempt upon *Rochefort* was neither ad-
" viſeable nor practicable. I concurred in that Opi-
" nion, and thought that neither my Duty, nor Re-
" gard for his Majeſty's Service, permitted me to
" depart from it.

" And that our Reaſons for ſo doing may more
" fully appear to this Court, I will ſtate, as clearly
" as I can, the Grounds upon which we proceeded.

" *Firſt*, In Confirmation of what has been already
mentioned in regard to the Landing, the Opinion
of ſo many Sea Officers of the greateſt Judgment
and Experience ſeemed abſolutely concluſive. To
this was added the Declaration of the moſt knowing
and able Pilot in the Fleet, who ſaid, that with
weſterly Winds, which ſet in from the Bay of *Biſ-*

cay,

" *cay*, he has known ſuch a Sea in that Road, that " he himſelf was kept many Weeks on Board his " Ship, without being able once to go on Shore. " And as in the Opinion of all, or moſt of the Sea " Officers, both weſterly Winds and blowing Wea- " ther were daily expected at this Seaſon of the " Year, it muſt appear, that the Riſque of ſending " the Troops aſhore, under the Circumſtances de- " ſcribed, could by no Means be juſtified, though " there had been a better Proſpect of Succeſs than " there was, in regard to the Attempt on *Roche-* " *fort*; as in all Caſes of a Deſcent, particularly of " a Deſcent upon the Continent of *France*, a ſecure " Retreat for the Troops, and a conſtant Communi- " cation with the Ships, from whence alone the " Troops are to draw their Proviſion and Ammuni- " tion, muſt be attended to by thoſe to whom his " Majeſty truſts the Command of his Troops, as ab- " ſolutely neceſſary, and that upon which the Ser- " vice wholly depends.

" In regard to the forcing of *Rochefort*, the weak- " eſt Part of the Place, according to the firſt Intel- " ligence of it, was at an Opening on the weſt Side " of the Rampart, ſaid by *Thierri* the Pilot, to be " about ſixty Yards in Length; but as this laid by " the River, where the Ground was in general low, " marſhy, and cut with Di.ches, into which the Tide " flowed, and alſo by *Thierri* the Pilot's Evidence, " was cloſed with a Palliſſade, it is plain, a few Days, " nay, a few Hours Work muſt make it defenſible " againſt a *Coup de Main*; as it is known, a good " Intrenchment may be thrown up, in ſoft yielding " Ground like that, in twelve Hours Time, and by " lying on the Water Level, the Ships in the River " would intirely command it, as the Pilot declared, " they did command all the Ground by the Water- " edge; and that, in the preſent Caſe, within leſs " than half Muſket-ſhot, which was a better Defence " than the Flanks of any Baſtions.

" A-

" As to the reſt of the Circumference, the Ram-
" part was generally proved to be ſtrong and high,
" with a Ditch, which two Witneſſes declared poſi-
" tively, they themſelves had ſeen full of Water
" quite round, by means of Sluices in the Town;
" and, though the chief Engineer did not think the
" Ditch capable of being flowed; yet if it was ſo, he
" thought it not practicable to take the Place by
" Eſcalade.

" Many of the Priſoners declared there were Num-
" bers of Troops upon the Shore, both Regulars
" and Militia, and even named particular Regi-
" ments.

" What ſeemed certain on the whole was, that tho'
" even after all the Alarm there was on the Coaſt,
" it was poſſible there might not be an Army aſſem-
" bled to engage us in the Field; yet it ſeemed highly
" improbable, that there ſhould not be a ſufficient
" Force to make a good Garriſon in the Place.
" There were alſo great Numbers of Workmen be-
" longing to the Docks; and the Crews of the Ships
" then in the River, if compleat, amounted to near
" 3000 Men.

" It muſt alſo be conſidered, that though no
" Alarm ſhould have been taken before we came
" within Sight of *Oleron*, which was on the 20th,
" it was from that to the 24th, when the Report of
" the Sea Officers was made, five Days incluſive;
" we muſt have been two Days more in Landing the
" Army and Stores; and had then, as we are in-
" formed, a March of eight or nine Miles to the
" Place, which muſt be made on the eighth Day
" from the Time we were ſeen on the Coaſt. There
" could be therefore no hopes of a Surprize; and as
" there was then a Mareſchal of *France* in or near
" the Place, it is impoſſible, but ſuch Precautions
" muſt have been taken, as no Officer of any Capa-
" city, or Experience, in the *French* Army, could
" have neglected. Add to this, that it was now full
" Moon, and the Nights were almoſt as light as

" Day: So that to think of ſurprizing, or aſſaulting " a Place, under all theſe Circumſtances, it is pre- " ſumed, muſt appear contrary to the Nature of " that Operation, and to all the Maxims laid down " by every military Writer of Diſtinction; ſuch " Attacks being, it is apprehended, only to be made " where you can run upon a Place in a Night's March, " and where you are by previous Intelligence, ac- " quainted with the Numbers and Nature of its " Garriſon and Guards, the Neglect of its Rounds " and Defence, the exact Height of its Ramparts, " and the State of its Ditch, Draw-Bridges, Gates, " &c.

" This I think is a fair Repreſentation of the " Proſpect I had in that Undertaking; which, in the " Opinion of the whole Council of War, could not " juſtify the expoſing His Majeſty's Troops, by " landing them without any Security for their " Supplies, or for their Retreat.

" The great Object of the Expedition having " thus been found impracticable; that we might " not remain inactive, while the Engineers were " demoliſhing the Fortifications of the Iſle of *Aix*, " we did our utmoſt Endeavours to diſcover, how " we might annoy the Enemy by any other Means. " The next Day after the Council of War, being " the 26th, was ſpent in examining Witneſſes, and " gathering Information, that we might judge if it " would be adviſeable to make a Deſcent on the Iſle " of *Oleron*, and to ſee if we could find out a land- " ing Place, from whence any Service could be done. " Evidence was examined concerning the Situation " of *Fouras*. The next Morning we went to re- " connoitre it from the Iſle of *Aix*; there was ſome " Difference of Opinion in regard to an Attempt " upon it, but we came to no final Reſolution 'till " the Afternoon, when a Propoſal was made to " land at *Chatelaillon*, and make a ſudden Attack " upon *Fouras*, and the other Forts leading to, and " upon the Mouth of the River *Charante*, with the

" Land

" Land Forces. A Council of War was ordered " to meet in the Morning; and that Council was " unanimous for attempting it that very Night.

" The neceſſary Orders were immediately given; " and about One o'Clock, the Grenadiers and great " Part of the Troops, who were to land with me " in the firſt Embarkation, were on Board; when a " ſtrong Wind blowing from the Shore, the Officers " of the Navy appointed to conduct the Landing, " repreſented, that it was with Difficulty the Long-" boats could make Way; that it would be Day " before the firſt Embarkation could get to Shore: " And that it would be five or ſix Hours more, be-" fore the Troops firſt landed could be ſupported " by a ſecond Embarkation. Add to this, that the " Boats belonging to the Tranſports would ſcarce be " able to get on Shore at all. For theſe Reaſons, " the Generals found the Forces could not be " landed that Night.

" The next Morning Sir *Edward Hawke* acquainted " Major General *Conway* and me, that if the Gene-" ral Officers had no farther military Operations to " propoſe, conſiderable enough to authorize his de-" taining the Squadron under his Command longer " there, he intended to proceed with it for *England* " without loſs of Time. I made anſwer, that I " would ſummon the General Officers to conſider " of an Anſwer; and I deſired him to ſignify his " Intentions in Writing; which he did in a Letter " to me. Hereupon I ſummoned all thoſe Land " Officers, who had been Members of the Councils " of War. We then took Sir *Edward Hawke*'s Let-" ter into Conſideration; and the ſmall Importance " of the Enterprize againſt the Forts did not appear " to us a ſufficient Motive to juſtify us in detaining " His Majeſty's Fleet. We underſtood the Fleet " was to be employed in more conſiderable Services, " after this Expedition was over; and we had " learned from the Officers of the Navy, that near " this Time the *French* Fleets from *Martinico* and

" *Louiſbourg* were expected. Theſe Conſiderations, to-
" gether with the Limitation of the Time for our
" return to *England*, induced us to conſent to Sir
" *Edward Hawke*'s Propoſal."

Adjourned till Monday *next the* 14*th Inſtant, at* 11 *o'Clock.*

" At a Meeting of the ſaid General Officers ap-
" pointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the Failure
" of the late Expedition, &c. (purſuant to Adjourn-
" ment) on *Monday* the 14th of *November*, 1757."

Read a ſecond Time Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Narrative, when he was deſired to lay before the Board the whole of the Paper he had from Sir *John Ligonier*, from which he has quoted two Paragraphs; and the ſame was read as follows, *viz.*

" There is a Chance in the beſt concerted military
" Enterprizes, which every Man of long Service
" muſt have experienced; what Share then muſt be
" left to Fortune in an Expedition, where neither
" the Country, nor the Number of Troops you are
" to act againſt, is known with any Preciſion.

" The Capacity of the Generals may ſupply this
" Want of Intelligence; but to give them any poſi-
" tive Plan, or Rule of Action, under ſuch Circum-
" ſtances, I apprehend would be abſurd.

" If I am rightly informed, the great Point His
" Majeſty has in View by this Expedition, and the
" alarming the Coaſts of *France*, is the Hopes of
" making a powerful Diverſion in Favour of H.
" R. H. the Duke, as well as the King of
" *Pruſſia*, who deſires and preſſes much this very
" Meaſure.

" In the Execution of this general Plan, a Project
" of giving a mortal Blow to the naval Power of
" *France*, is in his Majeſty's Thoughts, by attack-
" ing and deſtroying, if poſſible, the Dock, Ship-
" ping, and naval Stores at *Rochefort*. A Plan of
" that Place, given by one of his Majeſty's Engi-
" neers,

" neers, who was there in 1754, ſeems to encourage " the Attempt; and it muſt be owned, that without " ſuch Authority, it could hardly be believed that a " Place of that great Importance could be left in ſo " defenceleſs a Condition.

" In all doubtful dangerous military Attempts, " the Advantages that may accrue from Succeſs, " ought to be weighed againſt the Damage and Miſ- " fortunes, that may be the Conſequences of a Re- " pulſe; and that well conſidered, may in Prudence " determine the Choice.

" If an Attempt is to be made upon *Rochefort*, it " will be the Part of the Admiral to know the Coaſts, " to bring the Troops to the neareſt Place, to cover " their Landing by the Diſpoſition of his Ships, " and to deſtroy any Barbet Batteries, which the " Enemy may have upon the Shore, ſtill remem- " bring, that if the Troops are landed at too great a " Diſtance from the Place, the Deſign will become " dangerous, and probably impracticable.

" Suppoſing the Troops landed, it muſt be left to " the Conſideration of the Generals, whether they " ſhould not march with the proper Precautions di- " rectly to *Rochefort*, to prevent any Succours being " thrown into the Place; at the ſame Time that the " Marines ſhould be employed in making a good In- " trenchment for the Security of the Stores to be " landed from Time to Time, as well as of a Retreat " in Caſe of Neceſſity.

" We are told, the Country in the Neighbour- " hood is low and marſhy; that Circumſtance might " be of great Advantage in this Undertaking, be- " cauſe in that Caſe, Troops cannot march by *Over- " tures dans la Campagne*, but muſt follow the Dikes " or Cawſeys, which may be eaſily defended by " Coupures or Redoubts.

" A ſafe and well ſecured Communication between " the Camp and the Sea, from whence you are to " receive your Supplies of all Kinds, is abſolutely " neceſſary; the whole depends upon it.

" But this being done, I ſhould not be much in " Pain for the Safety of the Troops; an inferior " Number dares not approach you, and one ſuperior " will not be eaſily aſſembled, without your knowing " of it; and at all Events you have ſecured a Retreat " to the Ships.

" I would adviſe to procure Guides upon the Spot, " and paying them greatly, when faithful; there are " Numbers of Proteſtants in that Province, that " wiſh you well, and would be glad to go on board " with you.

" As for a *Coup de Main*, it may perhaps ſucceed " beſt at your coming up, as the Enemy may be in " great Hurry, Surprize, and Conſternation, at " ſuch an unexpected Viſit, and not have had Time " to make his Diſpoſitions. But if that is not " thought proper, it may ſucceed as well after the " Place has been thoroughly reconnoitred, and you " have fixt the Spots where you deſign to direct your " greateſt Efforts; and if the Enemy ſee any Prepa- " rations for a regular Attack, they will leſs ſuſpect " a *Coup de Main*.

" *Bergen-op-zoom* was taken by a *Coup de Main*, " after a long Siege.

" *St. Philip*'s was taken by ſcaling Ladders and a " *Coup de Main*, though the Garriſon was 3000 " ſtrong, after a Siege of 56 Days.

" The Neceſſity of dividing a ſmall Garriſon in a " Place of ſuch Circumference as *Rochefort*, may fa- " cilitate the Succeſs of a bold Attempt."

Upon reading that Part of Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Narrative, which relates to the Night of the 28th of *September*, in which Night it was propoſed to have landed, where one Reaſon aſſigned, why the Troops were not accordingly landed, is " that it would be Day " before the firſt Embarkation could get on Shore," a Kind of Contradiction was obſerved between that and Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*'s Letter to Sir *Edward Hawke* on that Subject, who writes, that " the Ge- " nerals are come to a Reſolution not to land To- " night,

" night, but to wait till Day-light, when they can " have a full View of the Ground where they are to " land." And Rear-Admiral *Brodrick* was thereupon desired to inform the Board, whether that was the Fact he meant to write, or whether he had, through Hurry, expressed himself otherwise than he intended?

Who said, that what was contained in the Letter he must abide by; that he gave it to Sir *John Mordaunt* to read before he sent it, to see if what he had wrote was agreeable to his Intention; at the same Time desiring Sir *John* would explain the Reasons fully, as the Blame would lye upon him, Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*; and that Sir *John* returned him the Letter, without making any Objection thereto; and answered him, that the Blame would not lye upon him, but that they (the General Officers of the Land Forces) would be answerable.

Rear-Admiral *Brodrick* added, that he believes Major General *Conway* likewise read the Letter.

Major General *Conway* said, that he did not read the Letter; and particularly remembers, that from the Letter being so short, he advised Sir *John Mordaunt*, that it should in his Opinion have been much fuller, setting forth the Reasons particularly of not landing the Forces that Night.

Sir *John Mordaunt* admitted, that the Letter was shewn to him; but in the Hurry he did not sufficiently attend to the Contents; and at the same Time did Rear-Admiral *Brodrick* the Justice to say, all was ready on his Part, and that he shewed the greatest Readiness to assist and co-operate for the Good of the Service; but that he was certainly mistaken in the Reason assigned for the not landing; and in order now to convince the Rear-Admiral thereof, desired him to recollect, whether all the Arguments used did not turn upon its being necessary, or at least advisable, to land before Day-light; which was thought scarcely possible, as the Wind then was.

Rear-Admiral *Brodrick* reply'd, that the landing would have been attended with great Difficulty, but is pretty well aſſured, they would have been on Shore before Day-light, or near the Time of Day; but that both Wind and Tide would have been againſt them for the ſecond Embarkation, which would have occaſioned at leaſt ſix Hours Diſtance between the firſt and ſecond Landing; he is nevertheleſs ſatisfied there is no Miſtake in his Letter, and muſt beg Leave to repeat the Words Sir *John* himſelf made uſe of, "that they muſt ſee the Ground they were to land "on."

Major General *Conway*, in order to explain this, obſerved, that Rear-Admiral *Brodrick* muſt, as he imagines, have miſtaken the Senſe, in which thoſe Words were uſed, as what he conceives to have been meant by them is, Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Intention of having the Ground viewed in the Morning, in order to embark the Night following.

The following Queſtions were then propoſed by his Grace the Duke of *Marlborough* to Sir *John Mordaunt*, deſiring he would uſe his Diſcretion in anſwering them, and received the ſeveral Anſwers ſubſcribed to each Queſtion, *viz.*

Q. Was the Attack of the Fort on the Iſle of *Aix* with a view to facilitate the Landing on the Continent?

A. When he firſt attended the Council in *London*, he underſtood it was; and is of Opinion, the Fort alone was of no Conſequence, had it not been with that View.

Q. Was that Attack neceſſary to engage the Attention of the whole Fleet and Army?

A. In his Opinion it was, becauſe he underſtood the taking that Fort, and Fort *Fouras*, was to be done by the Shipping, and then they might have gone on to *Rochefort*.

Q. Did he ſee any Number of Forces or Batteries on the Shore, ſo as to make the Aſſiſtance of the Ships

Ships neceſſary to cover the landing on the Continent?

A. There were Forces and Cannon, but the Number he can't anſwer for, and they were at a Diſtance from the Shore at the Time the Iſle of *Aix* was taken, and did not know, where there was a Place to land. The Captain of the *Viper* Sloop ſaid, the Sand Hills where they were to land would have concealed any Number of Forces, and it was not natural to expect the Troops would ſhew themſelves, till they knew where the Landing was intended.

Q. Did he ſend the Quartermaſter General or any Land Officers, with Rear Admiral *Brodrick*, to reconnoitre the Landing Places?

A. He thought that a Matter relating to the Sea, and he did not: And beſides, they could only make the Soundings in the Night, and conſequently his ſending a Land Officer with them could have been of no Uſe.

Q. When the Admiral returned with his Report, if a Council of War was thought neceſſary, why was it delayed till next Day?

A. It was propoſed by Major General *Conway* to go that Afternoon to the Iſle of *Aix* to reconnoitre from thence, whether they could find out any Place near or toward *Fouras*, and alſo to examine the Priſoners; and the Men of War laid at ſuch a Diſtance from each other at that Time, that the Members of the Council could not, without ſome Difficulty, be convened.

Q. Did he go that Afternoon to the Iſle of *Aix?*

A. Yes.

Q. Does he think, that a Detachment of four or five hundred Men could have taken Fort *Fouras* by Land, whilſt the reſt were marching to *Rochefort?*

A. He knew nothing, at that Time, of the Strength of Fort *Fouras* on the Land-ſide.

Q. Had he been in Poſſeſſion of Fort *Fouras*, could they not have ſecured a Retreat by that very narrow Neck of Land, which runs out into the Sea, againſt a much

a much greater Number of Forces, that might have oppoſed them?

A. For an Anſwer to this Queſtion, he begs Leave to refer to Major-General *Conway*, who laid that Way, with Vice Admiral *Knowles*'s Diviſion. —— Major General *Conway*'s Anſwer is, That the Part referred to, is not properly a Neck of Land, but a Sand, which is covered at High Water.

Q. (To Sir John Mordaunt.) Does he not think he could have ſecured a Retreat (independent of that ſuppoſed Neck of Land) if in Poſſeſſion of Fort *Fouxas?*

A. Doubtleſs it would have been of great Uſe for ſecuring a Retreat.

Q. Were not the Accounts of *Rochefort* contradictory?

A. It is difficult to recollect all that might be ſaid on the Subject; the Council of War ſhews there was a Contradiction.

Q. Did the Evidence of the *French* Priſoners taken at the Iſle of *Aix* contradict, or confirm the Report of Lieut. Colonel *Clerk?*

A. Some contradicted, and ſome confirmed it; but he gave little or no Weight to what the *French* Priſoners ſaid.

Q. Did the Evidence, that ſaid there was a wet Ditch round the Town, affirm, that that Ditch remained wet at Low Water?

A. He refers to the Council of War, and thinks from the Sluices at both Ends, it is natural to ſuppoſe it muſt be ſo.

Q. Does he think it poſſible to judge of the Practicability of taking a Place by Aſſault without reconnoitring, ſince the Evidence was contradictory?

A. His Narrative, as he conceives, explains that very fully; and he begs leave to remark that two Witneſſes ſaw the Place wet, and the other only ſays, that when he ſaw the Ditch, it did not appear to him capable of being flowed.

Q. Did

Q. Did he communicate his Inſtructions to the Council of War?

A. He laid them upon the Table.

Q. What was done on the 26th and 27th of *September?*

A. He refers to the Narrative.

Q. What Reaſons induced him to conſent to landing on the 28th, ſince it appeared ſo difficult on the 25th?

A. The Difficulty was the Retreat, and if they took *Fouras*, which it was in View to have done on the 28th, they had a Retreat.

Q. Why would he riſque the Troops on an inconſiderable Object, when he did not think it adviſable to riſque them on that of ſo much more Importance, and particularly pointed out by his Inſtructions, *viz.* the Attack upon *Rochefort?*

A. He looked upon it, the great Riſque was avoided by ſecuring a Retreat in the taking of *Fouras*, and in the other Caſe (that of attempting *Rochefort* without ſuch Retreat) he refers to the Quotation from Sir *John Ligonier*'s Paper uſed in his Narrative.

Q. How came he to reſolve on returning to *England* without holding another Council of War, ſeeing it had been unanimouſly agreed in a former Council to land?

A. He refers himſelf to his Narrative, and to Sir *Edward Hawke*'s Letter to him, which was produced, *viz.*

" *Ramilies, Baſque Road*, 29th *Sept.* 1757.

" SIR,

" Should the General Officers of the Troops have " no farther Military Operation to propoſe, con- " ſiderable enough to authorize my detaining the " Squadron under my Command longer here, I

" beg Leave to acquaint you, that I intend to pro-
" ceed with it for *England* without Loſs of Time.

" I am, Sir, your moſt Obedient

" To " Moſt Humble Servant,
" Sir *John Mordaunt*.

" ED. HAWKE."

Sir *John Mordaunt* having anſwered to the ſeveral Queſtions propoſed to him, deſired to obſerve in Addition to his Narrative, that the firſt Deſign was to have taken *l' Iſle d'Aix* and Fort *Fouras* by Sea, and then there would have been great Eaſe in the reſt of the Enterprize; that he imagined from the firſt ſetting out *l' Iſle d'Aix* and Fort *Fouras* could be taken by Sea; and in the Evening of taking *l' Iſle d'Aix*, Admiral Sir *Edward Hawke* mentioned, that he would take *Fouras* the next Morning, by laying a Ship to it: And the next Morning Sir *Edward* called for the Pilot of the *Magnanime*, and examined him, whether he could lay his Ship ſo, as to diſmantle Fort *Fouras?* to which the Pilot anſwered, he could. The ſame Morning Major General *Conway* came to the *Rumilies*, and produced the Plan referred to in the Narrative.

Colonel *James Wolfe*, Quarter-Maſter General upon the Expedition, being called, at the Deſire of Sir *John Mordaunt*, and deſired to inform the Board what paſſed the Evening after taking the *Iſle d'Aix*, in regard to the Attack of *Fouras*, — ſaid, that he had been at the Iſle of *Aix*, and returned about 8 o'Clock, and took the Liberty of ſuggeſting his Opinion to Sir *Edward Hawke* and Sir *John Mordaunt*, that he did not doubt but a Ship of War might batter Fort *Fouras*, and that a Body of Troops might be landed at the ſame time, and attack it with Succeſs: He took the Liberty alſo to mention, (as he only had ſeen the Fort) that if Sir *Edward Hawke* thought proper to make a Diverſion near *Rochelle* at the ſame time, it might

might engage the Attention of the *French*, and give an Opportunity of making a Deſcent between: He alſo hinted his Opinion, as to ſending the Bomb Ketches out, not knowing, but Bombs might be thrown into *Rochelle*; and Sir *Edward* ſent for them up accordingly. He likewiſe mentioned another Circumſtance, in regard to ſending for the Pilot of the *Magnanime*, who would inform Sir *Edward*, if there was Depth of Water ſufficient to carry a Ship up to *Fouras*; adding, from the indifferent Opinion he had of the Fort, a Forty or Fifty Gun Ship might at leaſt annoy the Fort, ſo as to give an Opportunity of Landing. Sir *Edward* then ſeemed to incline to the Attack of *Fouras*, and mentioned the *Barfleur* as a Ship he intended to employ; talked of doing it the next Morning, and appeared very keen and warm about it; that Sir *Edward* did ſend for the Pilot of the *Magnanime*, and examined him the next Day, but he, Colonel *Wolfe*, was not preſent; that he ſpoke to the Pilot of the *Magnanime* himſelf the next Morning, (but whether before or after his being examined by Sir *Edward*, is not certain) and aſked him, whether he could carry a Ship up to *Fouras?* The Pilot's Anſwer was, either he could (or he believed he could) take the *Magnanime* within half a Mile, as he underſtood, of *Fouras*; and if he recollects, ſaid, he would beat it down in leſs Time, than he had done the other Fort. He aſked the Pilot further, Whether between Fort *Fouras* and Fort *la Point* any Perſons could be landed during the Attack to inveſt *Fouras*, and deſired the Pilot to find a Guide amongſt the Priſoners, to ſhew a proper Place for landing, venturing to tell him, they ſhould be handſomely rewarded, if they performed the Service well. He alſo aſked the Pilot, why he choſe the *Magnanime*, rather than the *Barfleur*, or any other Ship? he anſwered, on account of the Captain, of whom his Expreſſion was, " *Il eſt jeune* " *& brave, Servez vous en.*"

Being aſked by Sir *John Mordaunt*, whether he ever heard

heard any Sea Captain ſay, he would undertake the taking of the Fort?

Anſwered, Captain *Colby* of the Princeſs *Amelia*, in Converſation on that Head, told him, he had made Offers to attack it; is not certain he ſaid, he had made thoſe Offers to Sir *Edward Hawke*, but frequently to Mr. *Brodrick*. He, Colonel *Wolfe*, likewiſe obſerved to Captain *Colby*, as it was then late, being the 28th *September*, if the Troops were puſhed, there might poſſibly be a Neceſſity of attacking it, in order to bring off the Troops; and ſaid, in that Caſe he ſuppoſed, as an *Engliſhman* who wiſhed well to his Country, he would urge the Admiral to do it; and, he believes, he ſpoke to the ſame Purpoſe afterwards to Mr. *Brodrick* in the *America*.

Being aſked, of what Strength did *Fouras* appear to him, when he firſt reconnoitred it?

Anſwered, he ſaw it immediately after the Attack of the Iſle of *Aix*, and it appeared to him to be a weak Fortreſs: The Front and Parapets were of Maſonry, which, he conceives, muſt have been of Advantage, and conſiſted of a ſtreight Line of a Wall, and another within that higher up, and no Outworks, (he ſpeaks of the Side towards the Sea.) — He could not from his Eye diſcover the Land-ſide, nor get one Word of Intelligence concerning it at that Time. There were 24 Embrazures to the Sea ſide, and a Battery beyond, which Battery he did not ſee the firſt Day.

Being aſked, (by Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Deſire) what Number of good Troops would, in his Opinion, have enabled a Commander to prevent their landing at the propoſed Landing-place at *Chatelaillon?*

Anſwered, Any Opinion he can form upon that Point muſt be very indeterminate; but, from what he could obſerve, the Sand Hills were pretty near to the Water-ſide, and his Notion is, all Circumſtances conſidered, a Thouſand good Foot, and 200 or 300 Horſe, might have prevented about 2000 Men landing from Boats.

Being

Being aſked by the Board, How many could have embarked in the Boats?

Anſwered, He believes there was never an exact Calculation made of that; he ſhould think about thirty-ſix Companies, which conſiſted of about ſixty private Men each, beſides Officers.

Q. Did he ſee any Troops, where it was propoſed to land?

A. No. He ſaw ſix Pieces of Cannon on the Point, but which he thinks could not reach the Beach.

Q. If a ſufficient Number of Men had been concealed behind the Sand Hills, could Ships in that Caſe be of any Uſe to cover the Landing?

A. No: Such Troops muſt have been ſafe from the Ships while concealed.

Colonel *George Howard*, being called at Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Deſire, and aſked, what Account the Captain of the *Viper* Sloop gave him? ſaid, that he received Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Orders to go reconnoitring with Colonel *Wolfe* on *Thurſday*, which he believes was the 29th of *September*; and when they came to the *Viper* Sloop, which was ſtationed neareſt the Coaſt, as they were taking their View of the Land, he aſked Captain *Skynner*, the Commander, ſome Queſtions relative to Obſervations he might have made. The Captain ſaid, he came there on the *Sunday* before, and that on the *Sunday* Afternoon, or *Monday* Morning, he ſaw a conſiderable Number of Troops marching down, and that he reckoned eight or nine Pair of Colours; that he ſaw them in Camp; that the next Morning the View of the Camp was intercepted, ſo that he could not ſee them again, which he attributed to the Enemy having flung up ſome Ground on the Beach; and that he ſaw the Sand Hills on the Beach conſiderably higher than they were on *Sunday* when he came there; which he, Colonel *Howard*, reported to Sir *John Mordaunt*.

Being queſtioned by the Board, whether he aſked the

the Captain of what particular Numbers he thought the Troops might consist?

Said, he did ask him that Question, and that the Captain answered him, he could not determine; but that he, Colonel *Howard*, might better judge from the Number of Colours.

Being questioned farther, he said, the Captain could give no Description of the Quantity of Ground they covered in their Camp, nor did he specify, whether they were regular Forces, or the Troops of the Country.

Captain *Thomas Osbert Mordaunt* being examined, at the Desire of Sir *John Mordaunt*, said, that he received a Message from Sir *Edward Hawke* the Morning after the Attack upon the Isle of *Aix*, desiring him to come down to the Cabbin; where he found the Admiral, Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, and the Pilot of the *Magnanime*. The Admiral desired him, Captain *Mordaunt*, as he did not understand *French* himself, to ask the Pilot some Questions for him. After asking some about the Approach to *Rochelle*, he asked particularly, how near a Ship could be brought to *Fouras*; the Pilot said, he could bring the *Magnanime*, as his Expression was "*dans un demy Mile*, "*meme dans un quart de Mile*;" but he must then run the Ship upon the soft Mud, in which she would stand secure till the next Tide, which would bring her off. And lest there should have been any Misunderstanding, as to the Distance intended by a Mile, the Pilot was desired to explain himself, and said he meant "Miles of *England*." The Admiral replied, that would do. The Admiral then asked, if, by lightening the *Barfleur*, he could bring her as near; the Pilot said he could, but he had rather go with the *Magnanime*, because Captain *How* was young and brave; and that he could not be better employed than in the Service of his Country. The Admiral mentioned, he did not care that Ship should go, as having been upon severe Service before.

Major

Major General *Conway* being desired by Sir *John Mordaunt* to give an Account, as to the Time proposed for landing, whether it was intended to have been by Night, or by Day-light, and the Reasons of its being put off, said, that he understood it to have been the Intention of all (he knows it was his own) to have landed in the Night, and the Disposition was made to land accordingly. Captain *How* first came on Board the *Ramillies*, where they all were before they went to their Rendezvous; and said, he was sorry to observe to them, the Wind was sprung up from the Shore, and feared it would be a great Obstruction to landing that Night.—Sir *John Mordaunt* said, he would go to the Rendezvous on board the *America*, where they should be better Judges, and that he would make the Landing, if possible. When they came on board the *America*, Rear-Admiral *Brodrick* and several of the Captains said (believes Mr. *Brodrick* spoke first, but is not certain) they hoped it would not be imputed to any Backwardness in them, but it was their Opinion, the Wind sat so strong against them, it would be about Day-light before the Boats could get to Shore, and six Hours more, before a second Embarkation could be landed. Sir *John Mordaunt* said, as he remembers, the Disposition was made for landing in the Night, and that he thought it must be put off to another Night; and took the Opinion of the Officers present upon that Subject.

Major General *Cornwallis* confirmed the same in general; adding, that he rather understood from his Conversation with Captain *How*, that his Opinion was against landing in general, as he confesses his own was; but it was most indisputably the Intention, that the Troops should land in the Night. He remembers Captain *Dennis* particularly thought the landing, as the Wind then was, an impracticable, or at least, a very dangerous Enterprize.

Colonel *George Howard* confirmed the same, as to the Disposition being made for landing in the Night, and the Reason of its being deferred.

Colonel *Thomas Brudenell* being desired by Sir *John Mordaunt* to give an Account of what passed within his Knowledge, as to the Difficulty of Landing, said, that by Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Orders the Afternoon of the 28th, it appeared the Intention was to land before the Day came on. The Long-boat belonging to the Transport he, Colonel *Brudenell*, was aboard of, was a pretty large one, and there were embarked in it 40 or 42 Soldiers. They waited some Time along side the Ship, expecting the Signal to put off, and observing that the Wind blew very strong from the Shore, he asked the Master of the Transport, whether he thought it possible, that the Yawl with four Soldiers in it could tow that Long-boat to Shore? who answered, he was satisfied it was impossible to do it in less than seven Hours, but he rather thought it was impossible to do it at all. He, Colonel *Brudenell*, had apprehended the Men of War's Boats were to have attended, and assisted in towing them; for having been on Board several Ships, it appeared to him an impossible Thing; this was about One in the Morning. Whilst they were waiting, an Officer of his Regiment, who had been on Board the Transport, whence the Grenadiers and Pickets were to go into the Boats, came on Board, and told him, Captain *Buckle* of the *Royal George* had been on Board that Transport, and observed to them, that as the Wind was, he thought it impracticable for the Boats to land; and that Captain *Buckle* was gone on board the Admiral to acquaint him therewith. In about an Hour and an half after that, another Boat came along side the Transport with a Sea Officer, as he believes, in it, who said, Captain *Buckle* was come back from the Admiral, and the Men were not to land that Night, but were to return to their Ships again. This he did not take for an Order, and so his Men remained in the Boat, where they had been some Hours, till he received Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Orders to put them on Board again. He likewise asked several others next Day, what had passed on board their

Tranſports, and found it to have been the general Opinion of the Maſters, that it was not poſſible to land that Night.

Vice Admiral *Knowles* being aſked, at Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Deſire, whether ſeveral Winds might not have kept the Fleet a conſiderable Time in *Baſque* Road, without a Poſſibility of getting out?

Anſwered, He has already given his Opinion in the firſt Council of War on this Head, to which he begs Leave to refer; for that the ſame Wind which would prevent the re-imbarking of the Troops, would detain the Squadron there.

Aſked, Did he not think it adviſable to ſail on their Return Home at the Time they did, conſidering the Situation of the *French* Fleets, which might be expected home?

Anſwered, His Opinion never was aſked about it.

Being deſired by Sir *John Mordaunt* now to give his Opinion on that Queſtion, ſaid, That after he found there was no landing for the Troops, without great Riſk, he ſhould, had he been properly aſked by his ſuperior Officer, certainly have given his Opinion for coming away.

Sir *John Mordaunt* here begged Leave to obſerve, that he did apply for a Council of War to Sir *Edward Hawke*, who refuſed him, giving him for Anſwer, that the Seamen had nothing to do with it, it was a Land Operation only: He, Sir *John*, ſince finds, upon a cloſer Peruſal of his Inſtructions, that he had himſelf a Power to have called a Council of War, but was not then appriſed of it.

Major General *Conway* was then queſtioned by the Board, Whether Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Inſtructions were laid before the Council of War?

Anſwered, Yes.

Q. What Reaſons he had to apprehend a Body of Troops to oppoſe their Landing?

A. From general Reaſoning upon the Subject, and the Information of the Priſoners.

Q. What was that Information?

A. One ſaid, there were eleven Battalions, another mentioned ſeven; and though he paid very little Regard to any of them ſingly, yet, upon the Whole, he thought there was no room left to doubt but there were ſome Troops.

Q. Whether any Batteries or Troops appeared to him?

A. Very few: There was a ſmall Battery, but he imagined the Troops would naturally conceal themſelves till the Attempt to land.

He then obſerved, that no Officer, as he conceives, called to a Council of War, is criminally accountable for his Opinion given in that Council; but if called upon he is very ready to give the Reaſons that guided his Opinion.

Being deſired to mention thoſe Reaſons, he ſaid, as well from general Reaſoning as Intelligence, tho' he knew of no conſiderable Army in the Field, he was perſuaded there muſt be a conſiderable Number of Men in *Rochefort*.—They had been ſeen five Days on the Coaſt, and two Days more muſt have been taken up in landing with the Stores.—They had no particular Intelligence of many neceſſary Circumſtances relative to the State of the Place: They could not ſurprize it, and had not Artillery to attack it in form, and no ſecure Retreat for the Troops.—That he did imagine there would be an Oppoſition upon landing, but the Want of a Retreat was the principal Objection with him.—He further ſaid, they had not at firſt ſufficient Intelligence to depend on taking Fort *Fouras* by an Attack on the Land Side; when he thought the Intelligence ſufficient, he did propoſe landing in order to attack it. He then, to ſave the Trouble of any further Queſtions, ſaid, that he had prepared a ſhort State of the whole Proceedings, beginning from the firſt Attack upon *Aix*, ſo far as his own Conduct is any way concerned, which was laid before the Board, and read as follows, *viz.*

" On *Friday* the 23d of *September*, I went up with " three Battalions to ſuſtain the Attack on the Fort " of *Aix*. " On

" On *Saturday* Morning I went on board the *Ra-*
" *milies* (Sir *Edward Hawke*'s Ship) and there gave
" in a Plan for landing as near *Fouras* as poſſi-
" ble, and attacking the Fort *de l'Equille* near it with
" a Detachment of Grenadiers, while a Ship lay up
" to batter the Fort of *Fouras* by Sea; and for ma-
" king a Feint on the Side of *Rochelle* and the Iſle of
" *Rhé*, to facilitate that Attempt. This Plan was
" accepted by Sir *John Mordaunt*, but not ap-
" proved of by the Admiral.

" Soon after the Rear Admiral and Captains, ſent
" to reconnoitre and ſound the Coaſt, reporting, that
" there was no landing Place near *Fouras*, and that
" the only landing Places they had diſcovered be-
" tween that Fort and *La Rochelle*, were near the
" Point of *Chatelaillon*; and it being alſo now de-
" clared, that the Fort of *Fouras* could not be at-
" tacked by Sea, that Scheme was laid aſide, and a
" general Council of War called, which met next
" Morning, the 25th; wherein it was unanimouſly
" reſolved, by both Sea and Land Officers preſent,
" that the landing near *Chatelaillon*, in order to march
" up and attack *Rochefort* directly, as the Queſtion
" was there ſtated, was neither adviſable nor prac-
" ticable.

" But a Queſtion being then propoſed for deter-
" mining to come back to *England*, I oppoſed it, as
" it was not in that View I gave my Aſſent to the
" former Queſtion; and thought we ſhould by all
" Means ſee, what farther could be done to annoy the
" Enemy.

" We met next Day to ſign the Council; and Sir
" *John Mordaunt* then propoſed landing on the Iſland
" of *Oleron*, and ſaid, he had mentioned it to Sir
" *Edward Hawke*, who approved it. To this I add-
" ed, that if that Place was fixt upon for a Land-
" ing, I ſhould then propoſe attacking the Caſtle of
" *Oleron* on the South End of the Iſland, and paſſing
" over from thence to the Continent, between *Brou-*
" *age* and the *Charente*, which is about a League,

" and from thence not more than two Leagues to " *Rochefort:* And as no Attempt was probably ex- " pected on that Side, we might poſſibly ſucceed, ſo " far as to deſtroy ſome of the Ships or Magazines. " But this Scheme being laid aſide after ſome Debate, " I then propoſed to the General Officers preſent, to " go and view *Fouras*, and the Coaſt near it, to ſee " what could be done on that Side, which was agreed " to.

" They met accordingly at the Iſle of *Aix*, where " I gave my Opinion for the Landing and Attack of " that Fort, and the Fort *de l'Equille*; but that At- " tempt being in general judged too difficult, it was " dropt.

" The ſame Afternoon I went on board the *Ra-* " *milies*, and propoſed to Sir *Edward Hawke* and Sir " *John Mordaunt* the landing at *Chatelaillon*, and " marching from thence to attack *Fouras* and the " other Forts on the Back; of which I thought we " had now ſufficient Knowledge to depend upon the " taking *Fouras*, as a ſecure Retreat for the Troops, " and that we might then ſee, what farther could be " done.

" This Propoſition was next Morning referred to " a Council of War, where it was agreed upon, and " ordered to be put in execution that Night.

" But was put off, on a Repreſentation of the Sea " Officers, upon account of the ſtrong Wind then " blowing from the Shore.

" It was alſo at the ſame Time reported, that " ſome Camps and Entrenchments had been ſeen on " the Shore, particularly near the Place where the " Landing was to have been made.

" I therefore aſked Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Leave to " go, and accordingly went next Morning to recon- " noitre the Coaſt from *Fouras* to *Chatelaillon*.

" On my Report, Sir *John Mordaunt* called the " Land Officers of the Council of War together, to " know their Opinions, whether it was now proper to " renew the Attempt for the Landing.—I did de-

" clare

" clare it to be mine, but the other Gentlemen being " all of a contrary Opinion, I acquieſced."

Major General *Conway* being aſked, by deſire of Sir *John Mordaunt*, Whether he, Sir *John*, did ſhew him Sir *Edward Hawke*'s Letter of the 29th of *September*, with regard to the Return to *England?*

Anſwered, That Sir *John* did ſhew him that Letter, and at the ſame Time offered Major General *Conway* (if it was his Opinion) ſtill to go on; but he replied, it was too delicate a Matter for him to take upon himſelf, unleſs it was alſo Sir *John*'s own Opinion; that whatever might be his private Sentiments, he ſhould acquieſce in the general Opinion, which he did accordingly.

Major General *Cornwallis* being called upon ſaid, As he did not imagine his Conduct was under inquiry, he is not prepared with a Narrative. That he was a Major General, and the Third in Command in the Expedition, and, as he conceives, not reſponſible for the Failure or Succeſs. That he was never wanting in any Part of his Duty, was always at his Poſt, and ready to obey any Order from his ſuperior Officers: That he attended Councils of War when ſummoned, as was his Duty; and when there, gave his Opinion according to the beſt of his Judgment, and does not conceive himſelf to be accountable for the Opinion ſo given: But to any Queſtions the Board ſhould think fit to propoſe, he would very readily give an Anſwer to the beſt of his Judgment.

Being aſked, Whether he did at any Time, in his Opinion, ſee it practicable or adviſable to land?

Anſwered, At no Time, as there appeared to him no Security for landing the Troops, nor any Retreat ſecured; and laſtly, he had heard an able Pilot ſay, he had been ſeven Weeks there, without a Poſſibility of a Boat paſſing or repaſſing. The Retreat and Communication between the Troops and Shipping, appeared to him abſolutely neceſſary; and their having been there ſo long, was a ſtronger Argument with him againſt landing. And informed, as he now is,

under all the Diſadvantage of popular Opinion, were the Caſe again to happen under the ſame Circumſtances, he ſhould now perſiſt in the ſame Opinion. He would as readily, as any Officer in the Service, have hazarded his own Perſon, if ordered to land with an Hundred Men only; but when called upon for his Opinion in ſo momentous an Affair, he could not anſwer to himſelf riſquing the Whole. He added, he was againſt the Meaſure of landing in the Second Council of War, but acquieſced in the Opinion of the Majority of the Council, and was ready at his Poſt, to put the Reſolution in Execution.

Being aſked, whether any Thing appeared to him to prevent the Communication between the Ships and the Troops?

Anſwered, no Men of War could get nearer than two Miles, which made the whole of the Communication precarious, as it depended only on the Wind's ſhifting into a particular Corner at the critical Juncture of the Equinox.

Colonel *George Howard*, as having been called to the Councils of War, by the Commanders of the Expedition, was then deſired to lay before the Board, if he thought proper, the Motives which had the principal Weight with him, together with any other Matters, that he might judge material for the Information of the Board; who ſaid, he was very little prepared, not knowing he ſhould be called upon, but nevertheleſs readily mentioned to the Board the principal Matters, which had determined his Judgement, being to the ſame Effect, as contained in the Paper by him preſented the Day following.

Adjourned till the Morrow at 11 *o'Clock in the Forenoon.*

At a meeting of the ſaid General Officers, appointed to inquire into the Cauſes of the Failure of the late Expedition, &c. purſuant to Adjournment on *Tueſday* the 15th of *November* 1757.

Major

Major General *Cornwallis*, desired to add, in Explanation of what he mentioned Yesterday, with regard to the Pilot's Evidence upon the Impossibility of passing, and repassing, that he does not thereby mean any particular Storm or Tempest; but that the ordinary Wind sitting in from the Bay, would make such a Surf on the Shore, that Boats could not go there.

Colonel *Howard* acquainted the Board, that he had now committed to writing the Motives of his Opinion, differing in little more from the Account he gave them Yesterday, than that they are more methodically digested, and desired they might be accepted instead of his verbal Narration; and the same were accepted accordingly, and read, as follows, *viz.*

" Unaccused and unconscious, as I am, of the " least military Misconduct, I shall however, for the " Satisfaction of this Honourable Board, relate the " Motives, which induced the Opinions I have " given, not as a Matter of Self-defence, but of " Evidence only, agreeable to the Summons I re- " ceived to attend at this Place.

" As it is well known I went upon the Expe- " dition, only as a Regimental Officer, and that my " Situation could neither intitle me to know the " Motives upon which it was undertaken, nor the " Springs which were to conduct the Execution of " it, I flatter myself I cannot be in the least account- " able for the Failure of the Enterprize.

" As the Execution of this Affair was intrusted " to three General Officers of such established Cha- " racters, I little thought I should be concerned, " but in a chearful Obedience of the Orders I might " receive from them.

" When I was summoned as eldest Colonel to the " Council of War on the 25th of *September*, I was " totally uninformed, as my Situation could not admit " of my being present at any previous Consulta- " tion.

" When

" When the Object of the Council was propoſed, " and the Rear Admiral's Report of the 24th rela- " tive to the Soundings and two landing Places, " which he had diſcovered, was read, the great Diffi- " culties, which attended the landing of the Troops, " Artillery, Ammunition, Proviſions, and Camp " Equipage at either of thoſe Places, as well as the " great Uncertainty of ſecuring a Retreat from thence " in caſe of any Emergency, and of preſerving a " Communication with our Shipping, were ſo fully " demonſtrated, (as no Ship, not even a Frigate of " the Fleet, could afford the leaſt Protection, either " in the landing or reimbarking of the Troops) that " I thought the Attempt uncommonly hazardous, and " that they were by no Means the proper Places of " landing, to facilitate the Deſigns upon *Rochefort*.

" In Conſequence of which Opinion, I aſked at " the Council of War, If it was not poſſible for a " Ship or two to favour a Deſcent of the Troops " near *Fouras*, by attacking that Fort by Sea; which " I thought ſhould have been the immediate Opera- " tion, after taking the Fort of *Aix*; as by that " Means we ſhould have been three Miles at leaſt " nearer to *Rochefort*, the Troops, *&c.* could have " been landed in a very ſhort Space of Time, and " nothing could have interrupted our Communica- " tion with the Ships: But the Admiral declared it " was impracticable, and that no Ship could go up " higher than the Iſle of *Aix* without being on " Ground.

" The other Part of my Opinion was founded upon " the Evidence mentioned in the Council of War, " being (as I have obſerved before) quite uninformed, " and not knowing any thing about *Rochefort*, but " from the Evidence which appeared at the Council.

" As to the ſecond Council of War on the 28th, " tho' I do not think any great publick Utility would " have been anſwered in landing the Troops for the " Purpoſes therein mentioned; and tho' the Pro- " poſal was made late in point of Time, yet I was

" deter-

" determined no Negative of mine ſhould appear to " any Operation it was thought proper to undertake " by ſo many better Judges than myſelf.

" I have ever been moſt ready to exert myſelf in " all Points of my Duty, ſhall conſtantly perſevere " in ſo doing, and defy the World to lay a contrary " Behaviour to my Charge."

Captain *William Phillips* delivered to the Board a Paper from Sir *John Ligonier*, which he was directed to inform them is the Original, of which Sir *John Mordaunt* produced a Copy, and refered to in his Narrative; and which Sir *John Ligonier* is deſirous the Board ſhould underſtand, was by no Means intended as Inſtructions, but only Hints, which he had put upon Paper and read to Sir *John Mordaunt*, who thereupon deſired a Copy. Captain *Phillips* likewiſe obſerved, That there is a Paragraph added at the Foot of this Paper, which is not contained in Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Copy, and which Sir *John Ligonier* had directed him likewiſe to mention to the Board: The ſaid Paragraph is, as follows, *viz.*

" When Sir *John Ligonier* wrote this Paper, of " which Sir *John Mordaunt* deſired a Copy, he knew " nothing of the Diſpoſition of the *French* Troops. " —The ſmall Number of thoſe Troops that could " be upon that Coaſt, by the Diſpoſition produced " at the Cabinet Council, leſſened very much the " Neceſſity of the Precautions to be taken for a Com- " munication or landing."

Sir *John Mordaunt* here obſerved, That thoſe Hints proceeded from his preſſing Sir *John Ligonier* to give him a poſitive Order; which, he ſaid, he could not do, but would give him his Thoughts.

Major General *Conway* confirms the Circumſtance of Sir *John Mordaunt* preſſing Sir *John Ligonier*, in his Preſence, and expreſſing a great Deſire, in ſo particular a Caſe, to have a poſitive Order.

Vice Admiral *Knowles* being queſtioned by the Board, Whether he knew of any Propoſal having been

been made for attacking Fort *Fouras* by Sea at any Council of War, or Meeting?

Anſwered, He cannot particularly charge his Memory, but knows very well Sir *Edward Hawke* aſked his Opinion about it, and ſaid, The Pilot of the *Magnanime* had told him, that a Ship could go within a ſmall Diſtance to batter it; and Sir *Edward Hawke* directed his Secretary to begin an Order directed to him, Vice Admiral *Knowles*, for the *Barfleur*'s being lightened for that Service; the *Barfleur* drawing near two Feet leſs Water than the *Magnanime*.

When he returned on board his own Ship, he ſent for Captain *Graves*, who commanded the *Barfleur*, to acquaint him with the Order Sir *Edward Hawke* had given him: Captain *Graves* anſwered him, That the Ship was on Ground where ſhe laid, and he might look at her, for the Water had ebbed away a Foot from her; and ſhe then laid between four and five Miles diſtant from the Shore; he acquainted Sir *Edward Hawke* with this, who ſuppreſſed the Order; but directed him to try to carry the Bomb-ketches in. He did ſo, and one of them which drew but eleven Feet Water ran a-ground at a greater Diſtance from *Fouras* than the Bombardier could throw the Shells with the greateſt Requiſite of Powder; the Flight of which he knows, at an Elevation of forty-five Degrees, will go two Miles and two Thirds; the Bombardier threw ſeveral Shells; whilſt the Bomb-ketch laid aſhore, two large Row-Boats with two Pieces of heavy Cannon in their Prows, attacked the Ketch, (full of Men each) upon which he (the Vice Admiral) made a Signal immediately for all the Boats in the Fleet, manned and armed, to go to the Ketch's Aſſiſtance; and went himſelf on board the *Coventry* Frigate to drive away the Row-Boats, which Frigate ran a-ground five Times conſiderably within the Space of an Hour, and at greater Diſtance from the Shore than the Bomb-ketch. He then ſent his Maſter on ſounding; and by the Bearings of the ſeveral Places

at

at which he took his Soundings, it appeared there were but ſix Feet Water at high Water, two Miles off the Fort.—He added, that he will venture to ſay, even if Frigates could have got to it, the Fort would have been attacked by Sea.

Being aſked, What kind of Landing there was at *Chatelaillon* Bay for Boats?

Anſwered, He was not there, but refers to Rear Admiral *Brodrick*.

Aſked, at the Deſire of Sir *John Mordaunt*, What Day the Experiment was made againſt *Fouras?*

Anſwered, He is not certain of the particular Day; it was two or three Days after taking the Iſle of *Aix*, if not four.

Rear Admiral *Brodrick*, being queſtioned by the Board, Whether he knows of any Propoſal being made for attacking Fort *Fouras* by Sea?

Anſwered, He never heard it propoſed; he was on a different Service.

Q. Whether he heard any Captain offer to undertake it?

A. He thinks he did in private Converſation hear a Captain ſay, he would undertake it, but no ſuch Propoſal was ever made to him, as Admiral.

Q. What kind of landing there was for Boats at *Chatelaillon* Bay?

A. It is a very fair, firm, ſandy Bay; a Bay where, in his Opinion, he could get out of the Boat without wetting his Shoes.

Q. How near to the Shore could the Men of War come?

A. By the Soundings he had, not nearer than two Miles.

Q. Did he obſerve either Troops, or Batteries, to obſtruct the landing, had it been attempted ſoon after his Return from the Soundings?

A. He ſaw ſome Troops, when ſounding, about 400 or 500 Foot, and 150 Horſe, to the beſt of his Judgment.—As to Batteries, he had ſeveral Shot fired at him whilſt he was ſounding; but at the Place where

where the Troops were to land, no Shot could have reached the Boats.

Q. What did he obſerve as to the Nature of the Country near the Shore?

Q. There were Sand-Hills the greateſt Extent of the Bay, about forty Yards from the high Water Mark.

Q. (At Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Deſire) Could not Bombs have reached the Troops behind the Sand-Hills?

A. He believes the Bomb-Ketches could have been of Service to annoy the Troops, if they could have come near.

Q. Might not ſeveral Winds have detained the Fleet in *Baſque* Road?

A. He refers to the Council of War, (in like Manner with Vice Admiral *Knowles*) ſaying, That the ſame Wind, which would have prevented the Troops from reimbarking, would have detained the Squadron there.

Q. As the Works of *Aix* were demoliſhed, the Wind was then fair, and the Fleet wanted at Home, was it not, in his Opinion, adviſable to ſail on the Return to *England?*

A. His Opinion was never aſked; but had he been called upon, he ſhould certainly have been of Opinion for the Fleet to have ſailed, upon a Suppoſition of no Land Operation being to be undertaken.

Sir *John Mordaunt* was here refered to, at the Deſire of Major General *Conway*, leſt any Doubt ſhould be entertained of his Propoſal having been given in, who ſaid, the Propoſal was delivered in, as mentioned in Major General *Conway*'s Narrative.

Colonel *James Wolfe* was queſtioned by the Board, What is his Opinion of the Practicability of landing Troops between *Rochelle* and Fort *Fouras?*

A. He ſaw the Bays upon the 29th *September*, and has a Minute of the Report he made, which he laid before the Board.—His Opinion is, It was very practicable in the great Bay of *Chatelaillon*; the leſſer Bay

he

he did not see much of. — The Minute by him delivered being read, was to the following Effect; That ‘ he was sent with Colonel *Howard* and Lieutenant ‘ Colonel *Murray* by Sir *John Mordaunt*, the 29th, ‘ to view the Bay of *Chatelaillon*, and their Report, ‘ as far as he can recollect, was to this Purpose, “ That they did not see any Batteries, Redoubts, En- “ trenchments, or Troops, to prevent their landing “ in the great Bay; but that the Sand-Hills were “ high enough to conceal the Motions of an Enemy. “ They were informed by the Captain of the *Viper*, “ whose Ship anchored nearest the Shore, that a “ Number of Men had been seen working in the “ Sand-Hills for some Days. There were six Pieces “ of Cannon upon the Point of *Chatelaillon*, and “ small Guards and Posts along the Shore of the “ lesser Bay.”

Q. Could the Boats have gone out of the Reach of the six Pieces of Cannon?

A. Yes.

Q. Had he been ordered to attempt landing at any Time with all the Men the Boats would have contained, did any such Difficulties appear to him, as would have justified him in representing against it as rash, or impracticable?

A. Had he been ordered to do it, he should not have represented against it. He observes, he did not see the Bay till the 29th.

Q. Did he ever propose to go out reconnoitring before that Time?

A. He can't particularly recollect: He looked upon it to be more immediately the Duty of his Office, as Quarter-Master-General, and was ready to go, whenever ordered.

Q. Does he know any Thing relative to Fort *Fouras* on the Land-side?

A. Only from viewing it through Glasses from the Isle of *Aix*.

Q. How far is it, as he apprehends, from the great Bay of *Chatelaillon* by Land to Fort *Fouras*?

A. He

A. He can't well ſay, he never was within the Bay; it may poſſibly be ſeven or eight Miles, but the gueſs is quite vague.

Q. How far from the Landing-place to *Rochefort?*

A. He knows nothing of it, but has been told it is about twelve Miles from the great Bay; about four Leagues.

Q. During the march from the Landing-place to *Rochefort*, might a Detachment ſent to *Fouras* of 400 or 500 Men in his Opinion have taken it?

A. He don't know the Strength of *Fouras* ſufficiently to anſwer that Queſtion.

Q. If the Troops had been in Poſſeſſion of Fort *Fouras*, would not a Retreat have been ſecured?

A. He ſuppoſes it might, but can't ſpeak with any Certainty, or Preciſion.

Q. What does he take to have been the Strength of *Rochefort* from the beſt Intelligence he could get?

A. He knows nothing of *Rochefort*; nor did he get any Intelligence concerning it.

Q. (At Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Deſire) Whether he heard Major *Deſbriſay* ſpeak of any Troops marching down, which he imagined were coming from the Iſle of *Rhé?*

A. Yes, on the 24th in the Morning Major *Deſbriſay* came on board the *Ramilies*, and addreſſing himſelf to him, (Colonel *Wolfe*) aſked him, whether he ſhould make a Report of what he had ſeen, *viz.* a Body of Troops marching towards the Shore from that Part of the Continent oppoſite to the Iſle of *Rhé*; he ſaid, he had alſo ſeen a Veſſel go backwards and forwards, which he ſuppoſed had carried the Troops over, but did not mention the Numbers. He thereupon adviſed Major *Deſbriſay* to go down and make his Report to Sir *John*, in the hearing of the Admiral.

Colonel *Howard* was aſked, by deſire of Sir *John Mordaunt*, whether he (Sir *John*) did not deſire him, as ſoon as ever the Iſle of *Aix* was taken, to pick up

up all the Intelligence he could from the Priſoners?

A. Yes, in Conſequence of which he ſpoke to ſeveral, particularly to ſome of the *French* Officers; but no ſatisfactory Anſwer was got from them. He knows likewiſe ſome were ſpoke to by Major-General *Conway*, and ſome were ſent for on the *Saturday* to be examined on board the Fleet.

Major-General *Conway* ſaid, he did ſpeak to ſeveral.

Captain *Patrick Tonyn* being aſked, at Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Deſire, what Orders Sir *John* gave him the Morning before the Council of War of the 25th on board the *Neptune?*

Anſwered, That Sir *John* came to him on the Quarter-Deck, and told him, ſome Priſoners were to come on board, and if there were any Soldiers, Serjeants, or Corporals, among them, directed him to collect what Intelligence he could by Bribes, offering them forty, fifty, or Sixty Guineas. The Priſoners came on board, but were moſt of them Labourers and Maſons.—He queſtioned ſeveral of them, but they could give him no Intelligence, as they were preſſed from a diſtant Part of the Country. There was a Soldier, or two, of the Regiment of *Poictou* amongſt them, Militia, but they could give him no Information.—This he reported to Sir *John*.

Lieutenant-Colonel *Robert Clerk*, chief Engineer upon the Expedition, was queſtioned by the Board, whether he had ever been at *Rochefort?*

A. Yes, in *April* 1754.

Q. Had he then an Opportunity of making any Remarks on the Strength and Situation of it?

A. Yes, his Letter to Sir *John Ligonier* particularly deſcribes it, to which he refers,—(being of the Number of Papers tranſmitted by Mr. Secretary *Pitt*, and which were read at the Outſet of the Inquiry.)

Q. Is *Rochefort* ſituated on a Flat, an Eminence, or a Declivity?

 A. That

A. That Part next the River is flat and low, but it riſes on the Side next the Land.

Q. Is the Ditch round *Rochefort* level with the River at High-Water Mark, or is any of it higher than the River?

A. A great Part is higher than the Tide can flow to.

Q. If any Part of the Foſſé is higher than the River, can that Part be filled with Water?

A. It cannot.

Being deſired to give a Deſcription of the Strength and Situation of *Rochefort*; he referred again to his ſaid Letter to Sir *John Ligonier*, which was read to him.

He deſired to make one Obſervation (in Regard to an Opinion which had prevailed, that his being permitted by the Governor to ſee *Rochefort* was in friendſhip, or particular favour to him) that he was intirely unacquainted with Mr. *Macnamara*, who was the Governor at that Time; and believes, he would have ſhewn the ſame Indulgence and Civility in every Reſpect to any Officer in Regimentals.

Q. Whether he has received any Information ſince to induce him to believe *Rochefort* was ſtronger at the Time of this Expedition, than when he was there?

A. No, he has ſeveral Reaſons, which induce him to believe, it was in the ſame Condition when they came into the Bay.

Being deſired to mention thoſe Reaſons, he ſaid, that the Day after the Council of War of the 25th, hearing there had been ſome Difficulties, he went to paſs a Day with ſome of the principal *French* Officers in the Fort in the Iſle of *Aix*. There were preſent the Engineer, the commanding Officer of the Marines, and the Commander of the Troops, with two or three other Officers of the Regiments. At firſt he examined two or three of them in regard to the Condition of ſome of the Places upon the Coaſt, and particularly *Rochefort*. He got at firſt no ſatisfactory Anſwers; upon which he reſolved to paſs the whole

whole Day with them. After Dinner he mentioned to the Company, that two or three of them had been very cautious of giving any Account of their Places, which he believed he knew as well as themſelves: Upon which he took out his Pencil, and drew a Sketch of *Rochelle*, deſcribing particularly its weak Sides, and then entered upon a particular Deſcription of *Rochefort*. He then took the Engineer along with him to walk round the Fort, and deſired him to tell him, if the Place (meaning *Rochefort*) was not as he deſcribed it, telling him beſides, that there had been a Diſpute between him and one of his Friends, who had it, by hearſay only, (that the Water could be thrown round the Town; he ſaid, that it was impoſſible upon account of the Inequality of the Ground, and that he (Lieut. Col. *Clerk*) gave a more particular Deſcription of *Rochefort*, than he could do himſelf, though he had been often there; but he had not examined it with great Attention, having always looked upon it as an open Place.---On the 30th at Night he went to the Iſle of *Aix* with Colonel *Wolfe* on purpoſe to endeavour to make the Engineer ſay the ſame thing before him, as he had only mentioned it afore in private; he brought him to Colonel *Wolfe*, and aſked, whether, or not, the Ditch could be made wet and Water thrown round the Town? his Anſwer was, that it could not be upon Account of the Unevenneſs of the Ground;--- his preciſe Words in *French* were, "*Ce ne ſcauroit être, a cauſe de l'inegalité du Terrain.*"

Another Circumſtance is, that on the 28th of *September*, 1757, after the Council of War had come to a Reſolution to land, he was on board the *Ramillies*, when Captain *Hamilton*, Aid de Camp to Major-General *Conway*, told him, there was a Fiſherman, a very ſenſible Man in his Opinion for a common Man, who had been at *Rochefort* the 21ſt, and had been ſince taken Priſoner, and examined by Major-General *Conway*. He got Captain *Hamilton* to ſhew the Fiſherman to him immediately, and aſked him a great

many Queſtions in regard to the Place; who ſeemed to be very diſtinct in regard to many particular Circumſtances; for ſo common a Man, much more than he could have imagined; he mentioned particularly that he went by *Rochefort* on the 21ſt of the Month, and that the Place which he Lieutenant-Col. *Clerk* had deſcribed to him as open and unfortified, was in the ſame Condition that Day. He aſked him the Queſtion ſeveral Times before many People, and particularly before Colonel *Wolfe*:---He had never ſeen the Man before.

A third Circumſtance is, that upon the Voyage home on board the *Royal George*, where were ſome *French* Priſoners, he found among them a Maſon, who had been employed at *Rochefort* about two Years, and enquired of him, if any of the Gates were upon a Level with the Ground, without any Bridge: He ſaid, there was one, but that it had a very good ſtrong Gate. The Reaſon of his aſking that Queſtion, was, that if Water could be thrown round the Town, there muſt have been a Bridge in his Opinion. This paſſed before Captain *Buckle* of the *Royal George*.

Since his Return to *London*, he has ſeen ſeveral People, who have been at *Rochefort*, and particularly Mr. *Plenderleith*, a Merchant, who was at *Rochefort* about 14 Months ago; and he confirmed him in this Particular of the Inequality of the Ground, and in every other Reſpect regarding the Place. This Mr. *Plenderleith* lived, for many Years, a Merchant at *Rochelle*, and he, Lieutenant-Colonel *Clerk*, knew him when he was there.

Major-General *Conway* ſaid, that he examined ſeveral Perſons, twenty at leaſt, and therefore cannot particularly recollect, whether the Fiſherman mentioned in Lieutenant-Colonel *Clerk*'s Evidence was one; but if the Name was mentioned, he ſhould perhaps remember,---and Lieutenant-Colonel *Clerk* thereupon mentioning, that he believes *Boneau* was the Name, Major-General *Conway* referred to a Minute,

which

which he took of one *Boneau* of *L'Iſle Dieu*, which is as follows:

" *Boneau de L'Iſle Dieu* was at *Rochefort* on *Wed-*
" *neſday*; does not know what Number the Garriſon:
" believes great Part came out to the Coaſt and Bat-
" teries, ſince we came.---Town not very ſtrong he
" thinks, but a good Rampart, and a *Ditch full of*
" *Water all round*.---That he ſaw it ſo.

" 11 Battalions at *Rochelle*--More on the Iſle of *Rhé*,
" ſeveral at *Oleron*-- Saw ſeven at *Rochelle* eight Days
" ago—Water over againſt *Fouras* at half Cannon-
" ſhot four Fathom—Many Batteries on the Coaſt—
" Some Sand, but moſt muddy—Iſle de *Rhé* good
" landing—Sand at Flat near the Shore."

Major-General *Conway* added, if this was the ſame Man (which he could not pretend to affirm) the Man was ſometimes clear, and ſometimes very indiſtinct.

Lieutenant-Colonel *Clerk* ſaid, the Man gave him an indiſtinct Account about the Ditch; and believes it to be the ſame Man.

Captain *William Hamilton* being called upon, at the Deſire of Lieutenant-Colonel *Clerk*, ſaid, he heard Lieutenant-Colonel *Clerk* aſk the Man many Queſtions, and amongſt others particularly as to the Side next the River, whoſe Anſwer was, Every Thing remained in the ſame Situation as before, and open.

Sir *John Mordaunt* obſerved, that *Boneau*, (if it is the ſame) was examined almoſt a whole Day before the Council, and he was ſo very indiſtinct and unſatisfactory, that the Council was quite out of Patience with him.

Lieutenant-Colonel *Clerk* deſired leave to remark, that though one cannot expect to have any diſtinct or ſatisfactory Account from a Fiſherman, or any common Man, in regard to a Fortification, and that one muſt even look for Contradictions in ſome Things, yet one may depend for a particular Circumſtance upon a Man of that Kind, very nigh as much as upon an Engineer.

Being asked, by desire of Major-General *Cornwallis*, when he had collected what passed, whether he acquainted the Commander in Chief of the *English* Forces with that Conversation?

Answered, He did acquaint Sir *John Mordaunt* with it the next Day in the Morning (being the 27th, the Day before the Order for Landing) and Major General *Conway* likewise, when they were walking at the Top of the Donjeon over the Gateway in the Isle of *Aix*, and mentioned particularly, that he had passed the Day with the People of the Fort, and particularly with the Engineer, on Purpose to examine him with regard to *Rochefort*; and that he had confirmed every Thing he, Lieut. Colonel *Clerk*, had said: And remembers particularly Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Answer, That no Credit could be given to what a *French* Engineer said on that Subject; and asked, if he was in that Situation, whether he would have explained any thing on such a Subject? His Answer to Sir *John Mordaunt* was, "Different "Men had different Characters; for his Part he be-"lieved him."

Sir *John Mordaunt* said, he remembers Lieut. Col. *Clerk*'s acquainting him with this Circumstance of the Engineer, and his making that Observation upon it.

Major General *Conway* desired, it might be observed, that his two Proposals came on that very Day, and the Council was called that Night, which came to the Resolution of Landing. He added, that he tried the Engineer, but without getting any thing from him.

Sir *John Mordaunt* said, that if he understood Lieut. *Nethercote* rightly yesterday, the Engineer told him quite the reverse;—and Lieut. *Nethercote*, of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, being thereupon questioned, said, That he did speak with the Engineer at the Isle of *Aix*, but had no particular Conversation with him about the Ditch at *Rochefort*, or the Place; but the Engineer gave him prevaricating Answers, and he did not chuse to proceed with him.

Lieut.

Lieut. Colonel *Clerk* being aſked, at Major General *Conway*'s Deſire, Whether he offered, or hinted at any Conſideration to the Engineer?

Anſwered, No, never any; he induſtriouſly avoided that; but explained, that in Diſcourſe he entered into their Affairs, thinking thereby to make them more free and open; and finding the Engineer, and one or two others, were likely to be ruined, unleſs they were ſoon releaſed, he promiſed to uſe his Influence to get them releaſed, as ſoon as they came to *England*.

Q. Did the Engineer give any other material Information about Troops, or otherwiſe?

A. No; he once threw it out to them, but he found, they ſhunned it.

Q. Did he aſk the Engineer concerning the Troops after the Information given him in regard to *Rochefort*?

A. What he aſked as to the State of their Troops was, to the beſt of his Knowledge, after the Information given him in regard to *Rochefort*; but the Engineer ſhunned giving an Anſwer, upon which he dropped it.

Being aſked by the Board, whether he knows any thing of the Strength of Fort *Fouras* towards the Land?

Anſwered, It appears by his Letter, he never had ſeen the Fort; and at the Council of War he told them, he had then never ſeen the Land-ſide of it.

Q. Did he ſee any Obſtruction to landing the Troops in the Bay of *Chatelaillon*?

A. None; when he reconnoitred with Major General *Conway* on the 29th; for he does not reckon the *Cannon en barbette* upon the high Bluff Point of *Chatelaillon* any Obſtruction at all, as the Captains of the Men of War had remarked in their Report of the 24th.

Q. (*By Deſire of Major General Conway.*) Did he hear him make his Report to Sir *John Mordaunt*?

A. He heard a good deal of it; he thinks not

the whole, but believes it to have been conformable to what he has now ſaid.

Q. Does he remember the Fort, or Cannon, upon the high Ground, on the other Side of the Fort *Fouras?*

A. He did not obſerve it himſelf; he knows Major General *Conway* mentioned it.

Q. (From the Board.) If Fort *Fouras* could not be taken, what Method would he have taken to ſecure a Retreat?

A. By making an Intrenchment at *Chatelaillon* to ſecure the two new Battallions, which he underſtood were to have been left there.

Sir *John Mordaunt*, after remarking that theſe two Battallions conſiſted intirely of new-raiſed, raw, and undiſciplined Men, deſired Lieut. Colonel *Clerk* might be aſked, If an able Engineer had been at *Rochefort*, with a ſufficient Number of Men and Tools, how long would he have been in making the Opening ſpoken of equally ſecure againſt a *Coup de Main* with the reſt of the Works?

To which he anſwered, That it is very difficult to aſcertain any thing of that Kind with Preciſion, and that no Concluſion can be drawn from what may be done; for what may be done, very ſeldom is done---even in *France*.

Q. (At the Deſire of Major General Conway.) What Time it would take to throw up an Intrenchment of a ſtrong Profil in that yielding Sort of Ground, ſuch as he threw up in the Iſle of *Wight*, with as many Hands, as could be employed?

A. Though this depends very much upon the Nature of the Ground, ſo that ſometimes a particular Spot takes double the Time of what a moſt able Engineer could determine at firſt (the particular Caſe of the Lines thrown up at the Iſland at the Entrance of *Portſmouth*, by Captain *Demeré*, having taken him five Times more Time than he expected) as for the Entrenchment thrown up in the Iſle of *Wight*, he believes it may be thrown up in a Day and half, or perhaps

perhaps even in a Day, with as many Hands as could be employed upon it.

Q. Does he not think that Ditches and the moraſs Ground would be an additional Strength at the Opening of *Rochefort?*

A. To be ſure they would.

Q. Were there not Ditches already cut, that would be an Impediment?

A. Yes.

Q. Does he not think Moon-light Nights would be a great Impediment to an Aſſault?

A. Believes the Moonlight could be no ſuch Impediment, as to hinder the Place from being carried in a couple of Hours.

Q. (From the Board) If, contrary to his Expectations, *Rochefort* had been too ſtrong to have been taken by a *Coup de Main*, could not the Store-houſes and Magazines have been burnt by throwing of Carkaſſes and red hot Balls?

A. Undoubtedly, by Carkaſſes and Shells one might deſtroy a great many of the Stores; but to do it in any tolerable degree, would require five times the Number of what they had with them; and that ſuch a Method would both take up Time, and there would likewiſe be great difficulty in bringing up ſufficient Stores for that Purpoſe to the Place.

Major General *Conway* deſired leave to produce a Minute of an Examination of a *French* Priſoner taken before Sir *John Mordaunt*, which was read, *viz.*

" *Pierre Girard de Rochefort*, Sailor, who ſays, " they have worked at *Rochefort* this Fortnight paſt; " that he has ſeen new Works; that they had work- " ed at the Ditch and at *Souterrains.*"

At Sir *John Mordaunt*'s Deſire, who ſaid he had lately received Information of a Letter found in the Iſle of *Aix*, the Poſtcript whereof he conceived material, as it ſhews Precautions were taken at *Rochefort*, Mr. *John Eiſer*, Engineer, produced a Letter as found by him in a Room belonging to a Prieſt in the Iſle of *Aix*, without Cover or Superſcription, the Day after the

the Fort was taken, dated, "*A Rochefort ce* 18," (the Month and Year not ſpecified) the Poſtſcript whereof is as follows.—"*Je vous prie d'aſſurer Monſieur* "*&* *Madame le* Comte *de mon reſpect*; *il conjecture* "*que la Saiſon eſt trop avancé pour que les ennemies en-* "*treprennent rien ſur nos Coſtes, mais la precaution de* "*Monſieur le Gouverneur n'en eſt pas moins bonne.*"

Lieutenant Colonel *Clerk* ſaid, That beſides the Particulars he has before-mentioned, he met with another Circumſtance that confirmed him in his Opinion about *Rochefort*, and that before he left *England*,—which is a Relation of the Port of *Rochefort*, printed in 1732. That Book gives a very clear Account how it comes to be in the Condition he has repreſented.—*Colbert*, who was Prime Miniſter of the *Finances*, intended, that there ſhould be nothing but a ſimple Wall round *Rochefort*, that no Garriſon of regular Troops might be put in it, on purpoſe to prevent Diſputes between Land and Sea Officers. The Governor built a Rampart in the ſame Form as he ſuppoſes the ſimple Wall was intended; that is to ſay, with Redans, than which nothing can be more abſurd. *Signellai* diſgraced the Governor upon that Account; tho' the Author takes his Part, and ſays, he followed the Plan of an Engineer.

Sir *John Mordaunt* begged leave to refer to an Examination taken by his Secretary Captain *Richard Davenport*, of *Pierre Girard*, Mariner, one of the *French* Priſoners, which being produced by the ſaid Captain *Davenport*, was read as follows.—"*Pierre* "*Girard*, Mariner, ſays, That he is well acquainted "with *Rochefort*, and was there on the 20th; that "there is a Ditch round the Place, of which two "Thirds are full of Water, and the other Third may "be filled at pleaſure; that the Avant Guard is for-"tified and defended by a faſcine Battery of ſeveral "Pieces of Cannon juſt finiſhed."

Robert Boyd, Eſq; Comptroller of the Train, by direction of the Board, laid before them an exact Account

count of the Proportion of Braſs Ordnance, Howitzers, Mortars, and Stores furniſhed from the Ordnance for this Expedition.

Sir *John Mordaunt* then addreſſed himſelf to the Board as follows,

" I am conſcious of having done my utmoſt to the " beſt of my Judgment for his Majeſty's Service in " the Conduct of this Expedition; and I have ſub- " mitted myſelf voluntarily and readily to this Ex- " amination. I deſire no Favour or Partiality, and " I know I ſhall have the moſt exact Juſtice in the " Report this honourable Board will make.

" I apprehend, that an Inquiry into the whole " Conduct of an Expedition, without any Accuſation " formed, or any Charge laid, is a Proceeding not " quite common; and however free from Guilt a " Man may feel himſelf, there are few who can ſtand " ſo ſtrict an Examination.

" There is nothing but the high Opinion I have " both of the Juſtice and Candour of this Board, " could make me eaſy in ſuch a Situation.

" I therefore hope you will be indulgent to my " Errors; but I deſire no Mercy for Guilt or known " Diſobedience, and with theſe Sentiments I ſubmit " myſelf to the Court."

No Perſon having any thing farther to offer, all Parties were directed to withdraw,—when the Board proceeded to take the whole Matter before them into Conſideration; and after ſome Time,

Adjourned to Thurſday *next at* 11 *o'Clock in the Forenoon.*

At a Meeting of the ſaid General Officers, *&c.* (purſuant to Adjournment) on *Thurſday* the 17th of *November* 1757.

The Board took into farther Conſideration the ſeveral Matters before them relative to the Failure of the late Expedition, and came to ſeveral Reſolutions; which they directed to be ſtated in a Report to his Majeſty,

Majeſty, and a Draught thereof to be prepared and laid before them at their next Meeting.

Adjourned till Monday *the* 21*ſt Inſtant, at* 11 *o'Clock in the Forenoon.*

At a Meeting of the ſaid General Officers, *&c.* on *Monday* the 21ſt of *November*, 1757.

The following Report to his Majeſty, prepared agreeable to the Reſolutions of the Board at the laſt Meeting, being laid before them, was approved and ſigned.

Report of the General Officers, &c. to his Majeſty.

May it pleaſe your Majeſty,

WE the underwritten General Officers of the Army, in Obedience to your Majeſty's Warrant, which bears Date the 1ſt Day of this preſent Month, commanding us ſtrictly to examine into the Cauſes of the Failure of the late Expedition to the Coaſts of *France*, and to report a State thereof, as it ſhould appear to us, together with our Opinion thereupon, have, at ſeveral Meetings, peruſed and conſidered your Majeſty's Orders and Inſtructions, as tranſmitted to us by the Right Honourable Mr. *Pitt*, your Majeſty's principal Secretary of State, together with ſundry Letters and other Papers therewith tranſmitted, and have heard and examined Lieutenant General Sir *John Mordaunt*, the Commander in Chief of the Land Forces, and other principal Officers employed on the ſaid Expedition, with ſuch Witneſſes as either of them deſired, and alſo ſuch other Perſons as ſeemed to us moſt likely to give any material Information; and in order that your Majeſty may be fully poſſeſſed of every Circumſtance, which has appeared in the Courſe of this Inquiry, we beg Leave to lay before your Majeſty the whole of our Examination, as contained in the Minutes of our Proceedings to this our Report annexed: And upon the moſt diligent and careful Review of the whole Matter, we do, in farther Obedience to your Royal Command, moſt humbly report to your Majeſty

jeſty the principal Cauſes of the Failure of the ſaid Expedition, as they appear to us, *viz.*

It appears, that one Cauſe of the Expedition having failed, is the not attacking Fort *Fouras* by Sea, at the ſame Time that it would have been attacked by Land, agreeable to the firſt Deſign, which certainly muſt have been of the greateſt Utility towards carrying your Majeſty's Inſtructions into Execution. It was at firſt reſolved by Sir *Edward Hawke* (*Thierri* the Pilot of the *Magnanime* having undertaken the ſafe Conduct of a Ship to Fort *Fouras* for that Purpoſe) but afterwards laid aſide, upon the Repreſentation of Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, that the *Barfleur*, the Ship deſigned for that Service, was on Ground, at the Diſtance of between four and five Miles from the Shore; but as neither Sir *Edward Hawke*, nor the Pilot, could attend to give any Information upon that Head, we cannot preſume to offer any certain Opinion thereupon.

We conceive another Cauſe of the Failure of the Expedition to have been, that, inſtead of attempting to land, when the Report was received on the 24th of *September* from Rear-Admiral *Brodrick* and the Captains, who had been ſent out to ſound and reconnoitre, a Council of War was ſummoned, and held on the 25th, in which it was unanimouſly reſolved not to land, as the Attempt upon *Rochefort* was neither adviſable nor practicable; but it does not appear to us, that there were then, or at any Time afterwards, either a Body of Troops or Batteries on the Shore, ſufficient to have prevented the attempting a Deſcent, in purſuance of the Inſtructions ſigned by your Majeſty: Neither does it appear to us, that there were any ſufficient Reaſons to induce the Council of War to believe, that *Rochefort* was ſo far changed in reſpect of its Strength, or Poſture of Defence, ſince the Expedition was firſt reſolved on in *England*, as to prevent all Attempts of an Attack upon the Place, in order to burn and deſtroy the Docks, Magazines, Arſenals,

Arſenals, and Shipping, in Obedience to your Majeſty's Commands.

And we think ourſelves obliged to remark upon the Council of War of the 28th of *September*, that no Reaſon could have exiſted ſufficient to prevent the Attempt of landing the Troops previous to that Day, as the Council then unanimouſly reſolved to land with all poſſible Diſpatch.

We beg Leave alſo to make one other Obſervation; that after its being unanimouſly reſolved to land in the Council of War of the 28th, the Reſolution was taken of returning to *England*, without any regular or general Meeting of the ſaid Council: but as that whole Operation was of ſo inconſiderable a Nature, we do not offer this to your Majeſty as a Cauſe of the Failure of the Expedition, ſince we cannot but look upon the Expedition as having failed, from the Time the great Object of it was laid aſide in the Council of War of the 25th.

All which is moſt humbly ſubmitted to your Majeſty's Wiſdom.

MARLBOROUGH.
GEORGE SACKVILLE.
JOHN WALDEGRAVE.

Privy-Garden,
21ſt *November*, 1757.

A true Copy,
CHARLES GOULD,
Deputy Judge-Advocate-General.

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

The PAPERS referred to in the foregoing REPORT.

Numb. I. *Copy of a Letter, dated* London, *July* 15, 1757, *from Captain* (*now Lieutenant-colonel* Clerk) *to Sir* John Ligonier, *and tranſmitted to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *with regard to* Rochefort.

SIR,

YOU have deſired me to put down in Writing what I mentioned to your Excellency in regard of *Rochefort*.

In returning from *Gibraltar* in 1754, I went along Part of the weſtern Coaſt of *France*, to ſee the Condition of ſome of their Fortifications of their Places of Importance, on purpoſe to judge, if an Attempt could be made with a Probability of Succeſs, in caſe of a Rupture; and of the *French* drawing away their Troops to *Flanders*, *Italy*, and *Germany*, in the ſame Manner as they did in the laſt War. I had heard, that *Rochefort*, though a Place of the utmoſt Importance, had been very much neglected. I went there, and waited upon the Governor in my Regimentals, told him, that I was upon my Way to *England* from *Gibraltar*; and, that I came on purpoſe to ſee the Place, the Dock, and the Men of War. He was very polite; I was ſhewed every Thing; went aboard ten

Ships of the Line new built: and, an Engineer attended me in going round the Place.

I was ſurpriſed to find, that though there was a good Rampart with a Revetement, the greateſt Part of it was not flanked but with Redans; that there were no Outworks, no Covert-way, and in many Places no Ditch; ſo that the Bottom of the Wall was ſeen at a Diſtance: That in other Places where the Earth had been taken out to form the Rampart, there was left about them a good Height of Ground, which was a Diſadvantage to the Place: That for above the Length of a Front there was no Rampart, or even Intrenchment; but as the Ground was low and marſhy at that Place, being next the River, there were ſome ſmall Ditches, which were dry, however, at Low-water; yet the Bottom remained muddy and ſlimy.

Towards the River there was no Rampart, no Parapet, no Batteries on either Side. Towards the Land-ſide there was ſome high Ground very nigh the Place, perhaps at the Diſtance of about 150 or 200 Yards.

The Engineer told me, that the Place had remained in that Condition for above 70 or 80 Years.

I got no Plan of the Place, and put nothing down in Writing; for I found that the whole Town had been talking of me, and thought it very extraordinary that I ſhould be allowed to go about and ſee every Thing.

I burnt even ſome Sketches and Remarks I had by me upon other Places, that they might have no Hold of me, in caſe they ſearched my Baggage, and therefore could only expoſe themſelves, as I had done nothing but what was open, above board, and with Permiſſion.

However, as to Utility, I was as much ſatisfied as if I had got a Plan. In regard of the Profil indeed, I have thought ſince, that it would not have been amiſs if I had known for certain the exact Height of the Rampart. I think that it could not well exceed

25 Feet. In *Martiniere*'s Geographical Dictionary, it is called only 20 Feet high; perhaps the Parapet is not included.

I told your Excellency, that I had never ſeen any Plan of the Place; but as there had been no Alteration in the Works for ſo many Years, I made no queſtion but that ſome old Plan of it might be found which would correſpond exactly with what I ſaid. In the Forces *de L'Europe*, which I have, there is no Plan of *Rochefort*, but I found one in the Duke of *Argyle*'s Edition, which I borrowed, and ſhewed to your Excellency. It agrees exactly with what I ſaid, and with the Sketch I drew of it before you from my Memory, except that a regular Ditch is repreſented every where, which is not the Caſe.

The River may be about 130 Yards broad. The Entrance is defended by two or three ſmall Redoubts, which I did not ſee, nor could I venture even to go down and examine the Coaſt.

What I mentioned to your Excellency of the Method of inſulting the Place, conſidering it upon the Footing of an immediate Aſſault, I have not put down; for, though it may be reaſoned upon in a general View, yet many Things can only be fixed and determined immediately upon the Spot. I was told, that there are never any Troops at *Rochefort*, but the Marines. There might be about 1000 at that Time.

By the Expedition to *Port L'Orient* in 1746, it appeared to me, that the Country-people in Arms are very little better than our own; and that an Officer who poſſeſſes himſelf, might march ſafely from one End of a Province to another, with only five Companies of Grenadiers, where there are no regular Troops. They imagine at firſt, that they can fight, and their Intentions are good till it comes to the Point, when every Body gives Way almoſt before the Firing of a Platoon.

In writing this I have obeyed with Pleaſure, as I have always done, your Excellency's Commands.

I am, *&c.*

ROBERT CLERK.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. II. *Minute, dated* Arlington-Street, Auguſt, 1757, *containing an Examination of a* French *Pilot.*

P R E S E N T.

Lord *Anſon*	Mr. Secretary *Pitt*
Sir *Ed. Hawke*	General *Ligonier*
Lt.-Genl. Sir *J. Mordaunt*	Admiral *Knowles*
Major-Genl. *Conway*	Captain *Clarke.*
Lold *Holderneſſe*	

Le nommé, Joſeph Tierry, Pilote François, Natif de Proteſtant de Religion, aiant été examiné, dit,

QU'IL a exercé le metier de pilote ſur les cotes de France au dela de vingt ans, qu'il a ſervi comme premier pilote, a-bord de divers vaiſſeaux du roi de France, & nommément du Magnanime, ſur lequel il a ſervi pendant l'eſpace de vingt & deux mois; qu'il a conduit le dit vaiſſeau le Magnanime pluſieurs fois a la rade de l'iſle D'Aix, & qu'il connoit bien l'entrée, & la ſortie de la dite rade; que le chennel entre les iſles d'Oleron & de Rhé a trois lieues de large, qu'il y a louvoié ſur le Magnanime, que les *bancs* qu'il faut eviter ſont pres de la terre, qu'on en peut diſtinguer les *briſans* a une diſtance conſiderable; qu'il y un banc nommé *le Boiard*, dont on ne courre pas grand riſque moiennant les *briſans* qui annoncent ſa ſituation; que pour entrer a la rade d'Aix il n'y a pas de telles difficultes, qu'il ſoit neceſſaire d'avoir un pilote pour y conduire des grands vaiſſeaux; qu'l y a bon moulliage tant en dedans la rade, qu'en dehors en mer a 12 & 14 braſſes d'eau juſqu' a Bayonne.

Que l'iſle d'Aix a environ ſept miles d'Angleterre de circuit, & un quarantaine de cabanes ou maiſons raſſemblées dans une eſpece de village, qu'il y a une batterie

batterie de vingt quatre, a vingt six canons, de 24 livres de bale, mais qu'il n'y a point de fortification, que les plus gros vaisseaux peuvent en approcher de bien pres, & que le vaisseau le Magnanime *seul* pourroit en peu de temps detruire la dite batterie.

Que les plus gros vaisseaux peuvent monter jusqu'a *Vergerot* a deux miles Angloises de l'embouchure de la riviere avec leurs canons & equipage, que la riviere est fort etroite.

Que l'on peut mettre du monde a terre au nord d'une batterie nommé *de Fourras*, sans etre ou du fort dans une praierie ou le terrain, est ferme & uni a la grande portée de canons des vaisseaux.

Que de l'endroit ou l'on met pied a terre jusqu'a *Rochefort*, il y a cinq miles Angloises, le chemin sec, & n'est point coupé par des fosses ny des marais.

Que la ville est presque entourée par un rampart, maisque l'endroit qui aboutit a la riviere des deux cotés il n'y a point de mur l'espace de soixante pas, qui n'est fermée simplement que par une barriere ou palliſade, & que le terrain pour aborder les dites palisades n'est coupé d'aucun fossé.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. III. *Memoire sur la Force actuelle de la France, & les Services auxquels elle est employée dans l'Année* 1757, *received* July 28*th*, 1757;—*and communicated at a Meeting at Lord* Holderneſſe's *House to the Generals appointed on an Expedition to the Coasts of* France.

MEMOIRE,

Sur la Force actuelle de la France par terre, & les Services auxquels elle est employée dans l'Année, 1757.

L'Armée Françoise, au commencement des troubles presents, ne consistoit

TRANSLATION.

MEMORIAL,

Of the actual Force of *France* by Land, and the Services on which it is employed in the Year 1757.

THE *French* Army at the Beginning of the present Troubles, consisted

ſiſtoit qu'en 157,347 hommes, non compris la milice & les invalides. Elle étoit compoſée de la maniere ſuivante.

Infanterie Françoiſe	98,330
Artillerie — —	4,100
Infanterie Etrangere —	25,589
Maiſon du Roi, Cavalerie	3,210
Cavalerie Françoiſe —	14,520
Cavalerie Etrangere —	960
Dragons —	7,680
Huſſars — —	800
Troupes Legeres —	2,158
	157,347

only of 157,347 Men, not including the Militia and the Invalids. It was compoſed in the following Manner.

French Foot —	98,330
Artillery — —	4,100
Foreign Foot —	25,589
King's Houſhold, Horſe	3,210
French Horſe —	14,520
Foreign Horſe —	960
Dragoons —	7,680
Huſſars —	800
Light Troops —	2,158
	157,347

Au mois d'Août, 1755, on fit une augmentation de quatre compagnies de 45 hommes chacune, dans chaque bataillon du regiment du roy, & de quatre compagnies de 40 hommes chacune, dans chaque bataillon ordinaire de l'infanterie Françoiſe; ce qui faiſoit en tout 29,620 hommes.

Environ le même tems, une augmentation ſe fit dans les dragons, qui porta chaque regiment à quatre eſcadrons de 640 hommes, montant en tout à 2,560 hommes.

Au mois de Decembre de la même année 1755, une augmentation ſe fit pareillement dans la cavalerie, de dix hommes par compagnie, en tout 5560 hommes.

In the Month of *Auguſt* 1755, an Augmentation was made of four Companies of 45 Men each, in every Battalion of the King's regiment, and of four Companies of 40 Men each, in every common Battalion of *French* Foot; which made in all 29,620 Men.

About the ſame Time an Augmentation was made in the Dragoons, which made up every Regiment four Squadrons of 640 Men; making in all 2560 Men.

In the Month of *December* of the ſame Year 1755, an Augmentation was alſo made in the Horſe, of ten Men a Company; in all 5560 Men.

Les volontaires royaux, & le corps de *Fiſcher*, furent auſſi augmentés ; nous ne ſavons pas au juſte de combien ; mais, ſelon nos avis, cette augmentation alloit à 680 hommes, ou environ.

Toutes ces differentes augmentations montent à 38,420 hommes ; & par conſequent l'armée Françoiſe (ſans compter la milice & les invalides, que je mets au dela de 67,000) eſt compoſée de 196,000 hommes. Ils ont, a la verité, levé deux nouveaux Regiments dans le païs de Liege ; mais, malgré tout cela, leurs troupes reglées ſont au deſſous de deux cent mille hommes.

Les iſles de *Minorque* & de *Corſe*, avec les colonies en Amerique, occupent au moins 25000 hommes ; ils ont fait embarquer, au printems, 3 à 4000 hommes differents ſervices aux deux Indies ; l'armée de M. le maréchal d'Eſtreés, ſi les regimens étoient complets, iroit à 92,000 hommes ; celle du marechal de Richelieu eſt de 32, 665. Il faut, auſſi compter un corps de 6 ou 7000 hommes, qu'ils

The royal Volunteers, and *Fiſcher*'s Corps were alſo augmented ; we do not exactly know to what Number ; but, according to our Advices, this Augmentation came to 680 Men, or thereabouts.

Theſe ſeveral Augmentations amount to 38,420 Men ; and conſequently the *French* Army (without reckoning the Militia and the Invalids, which I put at above 67,000) is compoſed of 196,000 Men. They have, it is true, raiſed two new Regiments in the Country of *Liege* ; but, notwithſtanding that, their regular Troops are under 200,000 Men.

The Iſlands of *Minorca* and *Corſica*, with the Colonies in *America*, take up 25,000 Men at leaſt ; they embarked in the Spring 3 or 4000 Men for different Services in the two *Indies* ; Marſhal *D'Eſtrees*' Army, if the Regiments were complete, would amount to 92,000 Men ; Marſhal *Richelieu*'s is 32,665. A Body of 6 or 7000 Men muſt alſo

qu'ils ſont obligés de tenir en garniſon à *Toulon*, *Marſeilles*, *Cette*, *Antibes*, *&c.* à porté de cette partie de leur Côte.

Selon ce calcul, donc, voilà 160,000 hommes de troupes reglées employées; il reſtera environ 40,000 hommes pour toutes les garniſon depuis *Sedan* juſqu'aux frontiers de la *Suiſſe*, de même que pour celles du *Rouſſillon* et de *Guienne*, ſans parler de la *Flandres* et de la côte.

Nous comptons environ 20000 hommes placés depuis *St. Valery* juſqu' à *Bergue*, de façon que nous avons tout lieu de croire, qu'il ne peut pas y avoir 10,000 hommes de plus, depuis *St. Valery* juſqu' à *Bourdeaux*.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

be reckoned, which they are obliged to keep in Garriſon at *Toulon*, *Marſeilles*, *Cette*, *Antibes*, &c. at hand for that Part of the Coaſt.

According to this Calculation then, there are 160,000 regular Troops employed; there will remain about 40,000 Men for all the Garriſons from *Sedan* to the Frontiers of *Swiſſerland*, as alſo for thoſe of *Rouſillon* and *Guienne*, without ſpeaking of *Flanders* and the Coaſt.

We reckon about 20,000 Men placed from *St. Valery* to *Bergue*; ſo that we have all the Reaſon to believe, that there cannot be 10,000 Men more from *St. Valery* to *Bourdeaux*.

A true Tranſlation.
Robert Wood.

Numb. IV. *Copy of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Aug. 5. 1757.

GEORGE R.

Secret Inſtructions for our truſty and well-beloved Sir Edward Hawke, *Knight of the Bath, Admiral of the blue Squadron of our Fleet, and Commander in Chief of our Ships to be employed in a ſecret Expedition for our Service; or for ſuch other Officer on whom the Command of our ſaid Ships may devolve. Given at our Court at* Kenſington, *the fifth Day of* Auguſt 1757, *in the thirty-firſt Year of our Reign.*

WHEREAS we have thought fit to employ a conſiderable Body of our Land-Forces on a ſecret Expedition, under the Command of our truſty and well-beloved Sir *John Mordaunt*, Knight of the Bath, Lieutenant-general of our Forces; and whereas we have appointed you to be Commander in chief of a Squadron of our Ships of War, to act in Conjunction, and co-operate with the ſaid Sir *John Mordaunt*, in the Execution of the Services preſcribed to him: For your better Diſcharge of the great and important Truſt thereby repoſed in you, we have judged it proper to give you the following Inſtructions.

1. You ſhall immediately, upon the Receipt of theſe our Inſtructions, repair to *Spithead*, where we have ordered a Squadron, conſiſting of at leaſt 16 Ships of the Line, and a proportionable Number of Frigates, to rendezvous, together with the Tranſport-Veſſels for our Troops, (who are to embark from the Iſle of *Wight*) and alſo the Veſſels with the Artillery and Stores, which Squadron and Tranſports you are to take under your Command; and, ſo ſoon as the Troops ſhall be embarked, you are to proceed without Loſs of Time to the Coaſts of *France*.

2. Whereas we have determined, with the Bleſſing of God, to proſecute the juſt War in which we are engaged againſt the *French* King, with the utmoſt Vigour; and it being highly expedient, and of urgent Neceſſity, to make ſome Expedition that may cauſe a Di-

Diverſion, and engage the Enemy to employ in their own Defence a conſiderable Part of their Forces deſtined to invade and oppreſs the Liberties of the Empire, and to ſubvert the Independency of *Europe*; and if poſſible to make ſome effectual Impreſſion on the Enemy, which by diſturbing and ſhaking the Credit of their public Loans; impairing the Strength and Reſources of their Navy, as well as diſconcerting and in Part fruſtrating their dangerous and extenſive Operations of War, may reflect Luſtre on our Arms, and add Life and Strength to the common Cauſe; and we being perſuaded, that nothing in the preſent Situation of Affairs can ſo ſpeedily and eſſentially annoy and diſtreſs *France*, as a ſucceſsful Enterprize againſt *Rochefort*: Our Will and Pleaſure is, That you do co-operate in attempting as far as ſhall be found practicable a Deſcent on the *French* Coaſt, at or near *Rochefort*, in order to attack, if practicable, and by a vigorous Impreſſion force that Place; and to burn and deſtroy to the utmoſt of your Power all Docks, Magazines, Arſenals, and Shipping, that ſhall be found there, and exert ſuch other Efforts as ſhall be judged moſt proper for annoying the Enemy. After this Attempt on *Rochefort* ſhall either have ſucceeded or failed, and in caſe the Circumſtances of our Fleet and Forces ſhall, with Proſpect of Succeſs, ſtill admit of further Operations, *Port l'Orient* and *Bourdeaux* are to be conſidered next as the moſt important Objects of our Arms on the Coaſt of *France*; and our Will and Pleaſure accordingly is, That you do proceed ſucceſſively to an Attempt on both or either of thoſe Places, as ſhall be judged practicable, or any other Place, that ſhall be thought moſt adviſeable from *Bourdeaux* homewards to *Havre*, in order to carry and ſpread with as much Rapidity as may be, a warm Alarm along the maritime Provinces of *France*: And you are, as far as you ſhall be able with the Fleet under your Command, to be aiding and aſſiſting to Sir *John Mordaunt* in the Performance of the ſeveral Services aforeſaid.

3. In

3. In caſe, by the Bleſſing of God upon our Arms, our Forces ſhould become Maſters of any Places on the Coaſt of *France*, our Will and Pleaſure is, That they do not keep Poſſeſſion thereof, but that after demoliſhing and deſtroying as far as may be all Works, Defences, Magazines, Arſenals, Shipping, and naval Stores, you do proceed ſucceſſively on the ulterior Operations of this Expedition, according as any of them may be judged adviſeable, and may be performed within ſuch Time as ſhall be conſiſtent with your Return with the Fleet under your Command, ſo as to be in *England* at or about, as near as may be, the End of *September*, unleſs the Circumſtances of our Ships and Forces ſhall neceſſarily require their Return ſooner; and our Troops are to be landed at *Portſmouth*, or ſuch other of our Ports as the Exigency of the Caſe may ſuggeſt.

4. Whereas it is neceſſary, that upon certain Occaſions, Councils of War ſhould be held, we have thought fit to appoint, and do hereby appoint ſuch a Council, which ſhall conſiſt of four of our principal Sea-Commanders, and of an equal Number of our principal Land-Officers, including the Commanders in Chief of our Sea and Land-Forces (except in Caſes happening at Land, relating to the carrying on any military Operations to be performed by our Land-Forces only; and in like Manner, except in Caſes happening at Sea, with Regard to Operations to be performed by the Fleet only) and all ſuch Sea and Land-Officers are hereby reſpectively directed, from Time to Time, to be aiding and aſſiſting, with their Advice as often as they ſhall be called together by you, or the Officer commanding our Land-Forces for that Purpoſe; and in all ſuch Councils of War when aſſembled, the Majority of Voices ſhall determine the Reſolutions thereof; and in Caſe the Voices ſhall happen to be equal, the Preſident ſhall have the caſting Vote.

5. Whereas the Succeſs of this Expedition will very much depend upon an entire good Underſtanding

ing between our Sea and Land-Officers, we do hereby ſtrictly enjoin and require you, on your Part, to maintain and cultivate ſuch a good Underſtanding and Agreement, and to order the Sailors and Marines, and alſo the Soldiers ſerving as Part of the Complements of our Ships, to aſſiſt our Land-Forces, if judged expedient, by taking Poſt on Shore, manning Batteries, covering the Boats, ſecuring the ſafe Reimbarkation of the Troops, and ſuch other Services at Land as may be conſiſtent with the Safety of our Fleet; as we have inſtructed our General and Commander in chief of our Forces, on his Part, to entertain and cultivate the ſame good Underſtanding and Agreement, and to order that the Soldiers under his Command ſhall man the Ships when there ſhall be Occaſion for them, and when they can be ſpared from the Land-Service; and, in order to eſtabliſh the ſtricteſt Union that may be between you and our ſaid General and Commander in chief of our Land-Forces, you are hereby required to communicate theſe Inſtructions to him, as he is directed to communicate thoſe he has received from us to you.

6. As our Service may require that you, or the Commander in chief of our Land-Forces, ſhould, on particular Occaſions, diſpatch a Sloop or ſmall Frigate to *England* with Intelligence, you ſhall always take Care to have with you one or more Sloops or ſmall Frigates for that Purpoſe.

7. You are to tranſmit conſtant and particular Accounts of your Proceedings to one of our principal Secretaries of State, and to our Commiſſioners for executing the Office of our High-Admiral of *Great-Britain*; and you ſhall obſerve and follow ſuch Orders and Inſtructions as you ſhall receive from us under our Sign-Manual, or from one of our principal Secretaries of State, or from our Commiſſioners for executing the Office of our High-Admiral of *Great-Britain* for the Time being. G. R.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb. V. *Copy of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir* John Mordaunt, *dated* Aug. *5th*, 1757.

GEORGE R.

Secret Inſtructions for our truſty and well-beloved Sir John Mordaunt, *Knight of the* Bath, *Lieutenant-general of our Forces, whom we have appointed General and Commander in Chief of all and ſingular our Troops and Land-forces, appointed, or to be appointed for a ſecret Expedition, for our Service; or for ſuch other Officer, on whom the command in Chief of our ſaid Troops and Land-forces may devolve. Given at our Court at* Kenſington, *the 5th Day of* Auguſt 1757, *in the thirty-firſt Year of our Reign.*

HAVING by our Commiſſion, bearing Date the third Day of this Inſtant, appointed you to be General and Commander in Chief of all and ſingular our Forces, appointed, or to be appointed, for a ſecret Expedition; for your better Diſcharge of the great and important Truſt thereby repoſed in you, we have judged it proper to give you the following Inſtructions.

1ſt, You ſhall immediately, upon the Receipt of theſe our Inſtructions, repair to the *Iſle of Wight*, where we have appointed Ships to convey you, and the Forces under your Command, to the Coaſts of *France*; and ſo ſoon as the ſaid Forces ſhall be embarked, you ſhall accordingly proceed, without Loſs of Time, under Convoy of a Squadron of our Ships of War, commanded by our truſty and well-beloved Sir *Edward Hawke*, Knight of the *Bath*, Admiral of the blue Squadron of our Fleet, whom we have appointed Commander in Chief of our Ships to be employed in this Expedition; the ſaid Admiral, or the Commander in Chief of our ſaid Ships for the Time being, being inſtructed to co-operate with you, and to be aiding and aſſiſting in all ſuch Enterprizes, as, by theſe our Inſtructions, you ſhall be directed to undertake for our Service.

2d, Whereas we have determined, with the Bleſſing of God, to proſecute the juſt War, in which we

are

are engaged againſt the French King, with the utmoſt Vigour; and it being highly expedient, and of urgent Neceſſity, to make ſome Expedition, that may cauſe a Diverſion, and engage the Enemy to employ in their own Defence, a conſiderable Part of their Forces, deſtined to invade and oppreſs the Liberties of the Empire, and to ſubvert the Independency of *Europe*; and, if poſſible, to make ſome effectual Impreſſion on the Enemy, which, by diſturbing and ſhaking the Credit of their public Loans; impairing the Strength and Reſources of their Navy, as well as diſconcerting, and, in Part, fruſtrating their dangerous and extenſive Operations of War, may reflect Luſtre on our Arms, and add Life and Strength to the common Cauſe; and whereas we are perſuaded, that nothing in the preſent Situation of Affairs can ſo ſpeedily and eſſentially annoy and diſtreſs *France*, as a ſucceſsful Enterprize againſt *Rochefort*; our Will and Pleaſure is, That you do attempt, as far as ſhall be found practicable, a De[illegible]nt, with the Forces under your Command, on the *French* Coaſt at or near *Rochefort*, in order to attack, if practicable, and by a vigorous Impreſſion, force that Place; and to burn and deſtroy, to the utmoſt of your Power, all Docks, Magazines, Arſenals, and Shipping, that ſhall be found there, and exert ſuch other Efforts as you ſhall judge moſt proper for annoying the Enemy.

3d, After the Attempt on *Rochefort* ſhall either have ſucceeded or failed; and in caſe the Circumſtances of our Forces and Fleet ſhall, with Proſpect of Succeſs, ſtill admit of further Operations; you are next to conſider Port *L'Orient* and *Bourdeaux*, as the moſt important Objects of our Arms, on the Coaſt of *France*; and our Will and Pleaſure accordingly is, That you do proceed, ſucceſſively, to an Attempt on both, or either of thoſe Places, as ſhall be judged practicable; or on any other Place that ſhall be thought moſt adviſeable, from *Bourdeaux* homewards to *Havre*, in order to carry and ſpread, with as much Ra-

Rapidity as may be, a warm Alarm along the maritime Provinces of *France*.

4th, In caſe, by the Bleſſing of God upon our Arms, you ſhall make yourſelf Maſter of any Place on the Coaſt of *France*, our Will and Pleaſure is, That you do not keep Poſſeſſion thereof; but that, after demoliſhing and deſtroying, as far as may be, all Works, Defences, Magazines, Arſenals, Shipping, and naval Stores, you do proceed, ſucceſſively, on the ulterior Operations of this Expedition, according as any of them ſhall be judged adviſeable, and may be performed within ſuch Time as ſhall be conſiſtent with your Return, with the Troops under your Command, ſo as to be in *England* at, or about, as near as may be, the End of September, unleſs the Circumſtances of our Forces and Fleet ſhall neceſſarily require their Return ſooner; and you are to land the Troops at *Portſmouth*, or ſuch other of our Ports as the Exigency of the Caſe may ſuggeſt.

5th, Whereas it is neceſſary, that upon certain Occaſions, you ſhould have the Aſſiſtance of a Council of War, we have thought fit to appoint ſuch a Council, which ſhall conſiſt of four of our principal Land-officers, and of an equal Number of our principal Sea-commanders, including the Commanders in Chief of our Land and Sea-forces, (except in Caſes happening at Land, relating to the carrying on any military Operations, to be performed by our Land-forces only, in which Caſes you may call a Council of War, conſiſting of ſuch Officers of our Land-forces as you ſhall think proper) and all ſuch Land and Sea-officers, in the ſeveral Caſes beforementioned, are hereby reſpectively directed, from Time to Time, to be aiding and aſſiſting with their Advice, ſo often as they ſhall be called together by you, or by the Commander in Chief of our Squadron, for that Purpoſe; and in all ſuch Councils of War, when aſſembled, the Majority of Voices ſhall determine the Reſolutions thereof; and in caſe the Voices ſhall happen to be equal, the Preſident ſhall have the caſting Vote.

6th,

6th, And whereas the Succeſs of this Expedition will very much depend upon an intire good Underſtanding between our Land and Sea-officers, we do hereby ſtrictly enjoin and require you, on your Part, to maintain and cultivate ſuch good Underſtanding and Agreement; and to order, that the Soldiers under your Command ſhould man the Ships where there ſhall be Occaſion for them, and when they can be ſpared from the Land-ſervice; as the Commander in Chief of our Squadron is inſtructed, on his Part, to entertain and cultivate the ſame good Underſtanding and Agreement; and to order the Sailors and Marines, and alſo the Soldiers, ſerving as Part of the Complements of our Ships, to aſſiſt our Land-forces, if judged expedient, by taking Poſt on Shore, manning Batteries, covering the Boats, ſecuring the ſafe Re-embarkation of the Troops, and ſuch other Services at Land as may be conſiſtent with the Safety of our Fleet: and in order to eſtabliſh the ſtricteſt Union that may be between you, and the Commander in Chief of our Ships, you are hereby required to communicate theſe Inſtructions to him; and he will be directed to communicate thoſe he ſhall receive to you.

7th, You ſhall, from Time to Time, and as you ſhall have Opportunity, ſend conſtant Accounts of your Proceedings, in the Execution of theſe our Inſtructions, to one of our principal Secretaries of State, from whom you will receive ſuch farther Orders and Directions as we may think proper to give you.

G. R.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. VI. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Whitehall, Auguſt 5*th*, 1757.

Sir,

I SEND you herewith the ſecret Inſtructions, the King has been pleaſed to ſign for your Guidance and Direction, in the important Command with which his Majeſty has honoured you: I have only to add

add my moſt ſincere Wiſhes for your Succeſs on this Occaſion, and to aſſure you, that I am, *&c.*

W. PITT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. VII. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *to Major-General* Conway, *Major-General* Cornwallis, *Vice-Admiral* Knowles, *and Rear-Admiral* Brodrick, *dated* Whitehall, Auguſt *5th*, 1757. mutatis mutandis.

SIR,

I HAVE the King's Commands to ſend you the incloſed ſealed Packet, containing an atteſted Copy of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir *John Mordaunt*, which you are to open, in caſe the Command in Chief of the *Troops* now under that of Sir *John Mordaunt*, ſhould devolve upon you, in order that you may thereby be fully appriſed of the King's Pleaſure, and be enabled to carry his Majeſty's Intentions into Execution, in which I am perſuaded you will exert your utmoſt Endeavours. I am, *&c.*

Sir Edward Hawke.

Fleet.

Sir Edward Hawke.

W. PITT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. VIII. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* Edward Hawke, *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated on board the* Ramilies *at* Spithead, *7th* Auguſt, 1757.

SIR,

I Received your Letter of the 5th Inſtant, incloſing the ſecret Inſtructions his Majeſty has been pleaſed to ſign for my Guidance and Direction in the Command with which he has honoured me; I beg you will do me the Juſtice to believe, that I ſhall exert my utmoſt Abilities for his Honour, and the Service of my Country. I am, with the greateſt Reſpect, *&c.*

ED. HAWKE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. IX. *Copy of a Letter from Major-General* Cornwallis. *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Newport, Iſle of Wight, Auguſt *6th*, 1757.

SIR,

I AM juſt now honoured with your Letter, with an incloſed ſealed Packet, containing an atteſted Copy of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir *John Mordaunt*, which I ſhall (conformable to your Inſtructions) open, in caſe the Command in Chief of the Troops now under Sir *John Mordaunt*, ſhould devolve upon me, that I may thereby be enabled to carry his Majeſty's Intentions into Execution; in which I will exert my utmoſt Endeavours, with true Zeal for his Majeſty's Service. I am, *&c.*

ED. CORNWALLIS.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. X. *Copy of a Letter from Vice-Admiral* Knowles, *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Portſmouth, Auguſt *6th*, 1757.

SIR,

I TAKE this Opportunity of acknowledging the Receipt of the Letter you honoured me with, containing an atteſted Copy of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir *Edward Hawke*, which ſhall remain inviolable in my Hands, unleſs the Contingency you mention make it needful to open them. I am, *&c.*

CHAS. KNOWLES.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XI. *Copy of a Letter from Rear-Admiral* Brodrick, *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt *dated* Portſmouth, Auguſt *6th*, 1757.

SIR,

I AM honoured with your Letter of the 5th Inſtant, with a ſealed Copy of ſecret Inſtructions for Sir *Edward Hawke*, which ſhall remain ſo, unleſs the Neceſſity

ceſſity of the Service ſhould require their being opened. I am, *&c.* THOS. BRODRICK.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XII. *Copy of an Order from the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Auguſt 5*th*, 1757.

By the Commiſſioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great-Britain *and* Ireland, &c.

HAVING ordered the Commanders of the King's Ships and Veſſels named in the annexed Liſt, to follow your Orders for their farther Proceedings: you are hereby required and directed to take under your Command ſuch ſixteen of theſe of the Line as can ſooneſt be got ready to proceed on Service, together with the Frigates and ſmall Veſſels, and uſe the utmoſt Expedition in getting them manned and ready in all Reſpects for the Sea; in caſe you take the *Royal William*, you are to cauſe Vice-Admiral *Moſtyn*'s Retinue and Servants to be removed into the *Royal Ann* or *Barfleur*, which ever of them you ſhall leave behind. And having ordered Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, and Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*, to put themſelves under your Command; you are hereby required to take them under your Command accordingly. Given, *&c.* the 5th of *Auguſt*, 1757.

To Sir *Edward Hawke* Knight of the *Bath*, Admiral of the Blue.

ANSON.
G. HAY.
G. ELLIOT.
J. FORBES.

By Command of their Lordſhips, *J. Clevland.*

Liſt of Ships and Veſſels, whoſe Commanders are directed to follow Sir Edward Hawke's *Orders.*

Guns.	Ships.	Guns.	Ships.
100	Royal George	90	Namur
	Royal Sovereign	84	Royal William
90	Ramillies	80	Barfleur
	Neptune		Princeſs Amelia
	Royal Ann	74	Magnanime

Guns.	Ships.	Guns.	Ships.
74	Torbay	28	Coventry
	Dublin	18	Cormorant
70	Burford	16	Eſcort
64	Alcide	16	Pellican
60	America	Fireſhip	Pluto
	Achilles		Proſerpine
	Dunkirk	Bomb	Firedrake
	Medway		Infernal
50	Norwich	Cutter	Hunter
		Buſs	Canterbury
32	Southampton		Medway

Numb. XIII. *Copy of an Order from the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Auguſt 6, 1757.

By the Commiſſioners for executing the Office of Lord High-Admiral of Great Britain *and* Ireland, *&c.*

IN purſuance of his Majeſty's Pleaſure, ſignified to us by Mr. *Pitt*, one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, you are hereby required and directed, in Addition to our Order of Yeſterday's Date, to proceed with the Squadron put under your Command, and the Tranſport-Veſſels named in the incloſed Liſt (which are ordered to join you and follow your Orders) to *Spithead*, where you will receive his Majeſty's Pleaſure for your future Conduct; and you are ſtrictly to follow ſuch Orders and Inſtructions as you ſhall receive from his Majeſty, or one of his principal Secretaries of State. Given *&c.* 6th *Aug.* 1757.

To the Hon. Sir *Edward Hawke*,
Ad. of the Blue, *&c.* at *Portſmouth*.

ANSON,
G. HAY,
J. FORBES.

By Command of their Lordſhips, *J. Clevland.*

A

A Liſt of Tranſports.

Maria Thereſa	Peggy
Duke of Cumberland	Friend's Adventure
Mill's Frigate	Three Siſters
Charles	Lion
Benjamin	Patience
Mathias	Gowland
Lark	Good Intent (2)
Reſpect	Freedom
Queen of Spain	John and Thomas
Alexander	Yarmouth
Nazareth	Thomas and Mary
Mary (2)	William and Mary
Amity's Succeſſion	Violet
Elizabeth (1)	Parnaſſus
Elizabeth (2)	Conſtantia
Neptune	Antelope
Good Intent (1)	Providence and Jane
Providence Increaſe	Baltimore
Royal Union	New Phillis
Reſtoration	James and Mary
Mary (1)	John's Adventure
Unity	Samuel and Robert
James and Henrietta	Prince George
Duke of Cumberland (2)	Proſperous Amelia
Ruſſel	

Numb. XIV. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Iſle of Wight, Aug. 11. 1757, *ten at Night.*

SIR,

BEING honoured with his Majeſty's Commands to correſpond with you, I think it my Duty to acquaint you, that on my Arrival here on *Monday* laſt, I was diſappointed in finding none of the Tranſports were come round, and the more ſo in that I have not yet been able to hear any poſitive Account of them: I have, however, employed this Interval in giving ſuch Orders as I thought neceſſary, to have the

Troops here in Readineſs for their Embarkation at a Moment's Warning.

Having, on Peruſal of my Commiſſion, ſome Doubt how far I am empowered to carry the Sentences of Courts-Martial in capital Caſes into Excution, during my Abode within his Majeſty's Dominions, I ſhould be glad, as ſoon as may be, to know what is his Majeſty's Intention on that Head, as there are now many Deſerters with us ordered for immediate Trial.

I muſt alſo beg Leave to trouble you farther, on a Matter which occurs to me relative to the Service I am going upon, which is, that having, ſince my Arrival here, converſed with Sir *Edward Hawke*, and Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, who both ſeem of Opinion, that it is poſſible, from the Nature of the Navigation to *Rochefort*, the Fleet may be detained even in Sight of the Coaſt of *France*, for a Week or ten Days, without being able to get into the Road, or off the Iſle *d'Aix*; during which time an Alarm will neceſſarily be given in thoſe Parts. This Conjuncture and Situation, if it ſhould happen, appears to me ſo very delicate, and equally to the other General Officers on the Expedition, who may by Accident to the firſt in Command, come to be under the ſame Difficulty (the Succeſs of our Undertaking depending, as I apprehend, on the Suddenneſs of its Execution) that I ſhould be glad, if it is thought proper, to have a Direction, how I am to act in that Caſe.

I ſend this by an Officer, who will take Care to deliver it ſafely. I am, &c.

J. Mordaunt.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XV. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt *to Sir* John Mordaunt, *dated* Whitehall, Aug. 13. 1757.

Sir,

I Immediately laid your Letter of the 11th inſtant, at Night, before the King, and am commanded by his Majeſty to let you know, That his Royal Intentions

tentions are, that you ſhould, by virtue of your Commiſſion, carry the Sentences of Courts-Martial, in capital Caſes, into Execution, during your Abode within his Majeſty's Dominions, ſo long as the Troops under your Command ſhall continue under their preſent Deſtination, according to the King's Orders and Inſtructions.

With regard to the ſuppoſed Caſe, as ſtated in your Letter, and ariſing from Converſation had with Sir *Edward Hawke* and Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, namely, that it is poſſible the Fleet may be detained in Sight of the Coaſt of *France*, for a Week or ten Days, without being able to get into the Road of *Rochefort*, or off the Iſle *d'Aix*, during which Time an Alarm will neceſſarily be given in thoſe Parts; in which Caſe you expreſs a Deſire, if thought proper, to have a particular Direction, how to act; I am commanded thereupon by the King, to ſignify to you his Majeſty's Pleaſure, That you, or ſuch other Officer, on whom the Command may devolve, do, in Conformity to the Latitude given by his Majeſty's Inſtructions, judge of the Practicability of the Service, on the Spot, according as contingent Events, and particular Circumſtances, may require; the King judging it highly prejudicial to the Good of his Service to give particular Orders and Directions, with regard to poſſible contingent Caſes that may ariſe.

I am, *&c.* W. PITT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XVI. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated Head-Quarters*, Newport, Aug. 20. 1757.

SIR,

I Have the Honour of your Commands, dated *Auguſt* 13th, and you may depend upon it, that his Majeſty's Orders ſhall be moſt punctually obſerved.

Mr. *Thames*, who has long been, and now is, Agent for the Tranſports, came here the 17th from *Portſmouth*: He ſaid, he came over on Purpoſe, from

thinking it his Duty to inform me, the Tranſports were not ſufficient for the Number of Troops. I own his Converſation much puzzled me, as I know our Expedition ſhould meet with no Delay on one Hand, and that the Preſervation of the Soldier's Healths ought on the other to be thought on. At length I recollected two of the Commiſſioners of the Admiralty were at *Portſmouth*, to whom I ſent a Letter, a Copy of which I now encloſe to you. Though I have ſince heard nothing from the Commiſſioners or Mr. *Thames*, I thought it my Duty to mention this Circumſtance to you, being informed laſt Night, by a Letter from Sir *Edward Hawke*, that an Expreſs is ſent to the Navy-Board upon this Occaſion.

The Troops are in great Spirits, and wait impatiently for the Tranſports.

I am, *&c.* J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XVII. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt, *to* Thomas Orby Hunter *and* Gilbert Eliott, *Eſquires, dated Head-Quarters* Newport, Aug. 17. 1757, *encloſed in Sir* John Mordaunt's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *of the 20th* Aug. 1757.

GENTLEMEN,

MR. *Thames*, Agent for the Tranſports, has juſt been with us, and ſays, he thinks it his Duty to mention, that the Tranſports are not ſufficient to carry the Number of Troops. We ſend him with this Letter, that he may explain his Reaſons for the Opinion he gives, and if you find them ſatisfactory, we flatter ourſelves ſome Method may be found, without occaſioning Delay, to redreſs the Grievance. I am, Gentlemen, *&c.*

(Signed) J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb. XVIII. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Aug. 23. 1757.

SIR,

A Doubt having been ſtarted by Mr. *Thames*, Agent for the Tranſports at *Portſmouth*, whether the Veſſels ordered there will be ſufficient for the Number of Troops; I am commanded to ſignify to you the King's Pleaſure, that in caſe of any Exigency, you do receive on board the Men of War, ſuch Part of the Troops as may be neceſſary, and can be accommodated therein without Prejudice to his Majeſty's Ships.

I am, *&c.* W. PITT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XIX. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt *to Sir* John Mordaunt, *dated* Aug. 23. 1757.

SIR,

I Have received the Favour of your Letter of the 20th Inſtant, and have, in conſequence thereof, made the neceſſary Enquiries, with regard to the Doubt ſtarted by Mr. *Thames*, that the Tranſports ordered to *Portſmouth* would not be ſufficient for the Number of Troops.

The incloſed Papers, containing the Orders given by the Admiralty on this Subject, will, I am perſuaded, give you full Satisfaction, and remove any Doubts of this Sort; and, tho' there is the greateſt Reaſon to imagine that a ſufficient Quantity of Tranſport-Veſſels has been provided for this Service, I have, however, ſignified the King's Pleaſure to Sir *Edward Hawke* by this Night's Poſt, that he ſhould, in caſe of any Exigency, receive on board the Men of War, ſuch a Number of the Troops as may be neceſſary, and can be accommodated therein, without Prejudice to his Majeſty's Service.

I am, *&c.* W. PITT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb XX. *Copy of a Letter from Mr.* Clevland *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *at* Portſmouth, *dated* Admiralty-Office, Aug. 19. 1757, *encloſed in Mr. Secretary* Pitt's *Letter to Sir* John Mordaunt *of the* 23d Aug. 1757.

Sir,

MY Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty having been informed, that one Mr. *Thames*, a Perſon ſent to *Portſmouth* by the Navy-Board to aſſiſt the Agent for Tranſports in the Embarkation of the Troops, has repreſented to Sir *John Mordaunt*, and yourſelf, that the Tonnage for the Troops is not ſufficient, thoſe that went to *l'Orient* in 1746 being allowed one Ton and half to each Man, their Lordſhips command me to acquaint you, that they are extremely ſurpriſed and diſpleaſed at the ſaid *Thames*'s Behaviour, in raiſing unneceſſary Difficulties and Uneaſineſſes; and, that they may not have any ill Effect, their Lordſhips direct me to acquaint you, that the Rate of one Ton a Man is as much as has been allowed on the like Services in former Times; that with regard to the Troops ſent to Port *l'Orient*, they had a greater Allowance, on account of their being originally deſigned for *Louisbourg*; but that you may be ſatisfied of the whole Tonnage, I beg Leave to refer you to the Liſt of all the Tranſports ſent to you in the Lords' Order of the 6th Inſtant, (to which the proſperous *Amelia* of 400 Tons is to be added) amounting to about 12400 Tons, 9500 of which are fitted for the Reception of the Troops, which will probably be far ſhort of 8000; wherefore their Lordſhips recommend it to you to endeavour to remove any Uneaſineſs that Mr. *Thames*'s Repreſentation may have created, they being thoroughly ſatisfied that no Inconveniencies whatever will attend the preſent Allowance; but, on the contrary, the Service will be attended with leſs Accidents and Delays, by having fewer Ships.

I am, *&c.* J. Clevland.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb. XXI. *Copy of a Letter from Mr.* Clevland *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Auguſt 20*th*, 1757, *encloſed in Mr. Secretary* Pitt's *Letter to Sir* John Mordaunt *of the* 23*d of* Auguſt, 1757.

SIR,

I Have communicated to my Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty your Letter of Yeſterday, informing their Lordſhips, that upon a Conſultation with Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, and the Director of the Embarkation, you were unanimouſly of Opinion, that at leaſt four thouſand Ton of Tranſports are ſtill wanting; and am commanded by their Lordſhips to acquaint you, that they have Reaſon to believe this Perſon, who the Navy-Board have ſent to *Portſmouth*, is ignorant in what Manner the Tranſports are fitted, otherwiſe he could not miſtake ſo much in his Calculation; for theſe Ships have all of them two fluſh Platforms between Decks for the Men to lay their Bedding upon, by which Means many more can be conveniently ſtowed than in Cabbins, the uſual Method of fitting Tranſports; wherefore the Lords are of Opinion there will be ſufficient Room, agreeable to what I writ you in my Letter Yeſterday; however, to remove the Difficulties and Uneaſineſs which Mr. *Thames* has raiſed, Mr. *Cockburne*, the Comptroller of the Navy, is ſent to *Portſmouth* with Directions to do every Thing poſſible, and to furniſh ſuch other Ships as ſhall be ready, if neceſſary.

I am, &c.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXII. *Copy of a Letter from Mr.* Clevland *to Mr.* Cockburne, *dated* Auguſt 21ſt, 1757, *encloſed in Mr. Secretary* Pitt's *Letter to Sir* John Mordaunt *of the* 23*d of* Auguſt, 1757.

SIR,

IN anſwer to your Letter of Yeſterday to my Lord *Anſon*, I am commanded by my Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, that although they

they are perſuaded the Tranſports coming round from the River to *Portſmouth*, are ſufficient for the Troops that are to embark on the preſent Expedition; yet to prevent Uneaſineſs or Diſſatisfaction in any Perſons whatever, their Lordſhips approve of your adding the five or ſix hundred Ton of Shipping you mention to be employed as you propoſe: Alſo the *Jaſon*'s being properly fitted to carry 500 Men, by leaving behind her lower Tier of Guns, which their Lordſhips hope will quiet the Minds of every one, without the Addition of the *Cheſterfield*, a Ship wanted on very material Service; however, ſhe will be getting ready; but their Lordſhips direct me to obſerve to you, that nothing herein-mentioned is intended, if it ſhall be found to delay the Tranſports a Moment after they arrive at *Spithead*, as the Succeſs of the whole depends upon their ſailing with the utmoſt Expedition; wherefore their Lordſhips recommend it to you to exert yourſelf in forwarding this Service, and Orders in Form will be forwarded, when they meet To-morrow, this being ſent to ſave Time.

I am, &c.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXIII. *Copy of a Letter from Mr.* Cockburne *to Mr.* Clevland, *dated* Auguſt 23*d*, 1757, *enclоſed in Mr. Secretary* Pitt*'s Letter to Sir* John Mordaunt, *of the* 23*d of* Auguſt, 1757,

Sir,

YOU will pleaſe to acquaint their Lordſhips that I went over this Morning to the *Iſle of Wight*, to talk with Sir *John Mordaunt* about the Tonnage of the Tranſports, and found Sir *John* had been informed that a Ton and a Half to a Man was the leaſt that had ever been allowed to Troops on foreign Voyages, or where there was a Probability of their continuing any conſiderable Time on board, which he ſeemed to think might be the Caſe with theſe, and apprehended they would be too much crowded, if confined to one Ton to each Man only: I explained to him the Man-

ner in which they were fitted, and told him of the Addition propoſed to be made, which ſeemed to ſatisfy him entirely: I alſo propoſed to Sir *John* to turn the proſperous *Amelia* into a Foot-Ship, and to ſtow the Faſcines, *&c.* in the Holds of the Hoſpital Ships, which he alſo approved on: I have writ to the Navy-Board, and deſired they would ſend an Expreſs to *Deal* (in caſe the Tranſports are detained by the Wind there) to order her to be fitted accordingly, which may be eaſily done even on the Paſſage here, by the Aſſiſtance of the Carpenters of the Men of War that come round with them, if their Lordſhips pleaſe to give the Commanding Officer Orders for that Purpoſe. This Ship has only fourteen Days Proviſions on board for four hundred Men; I propoſe putting only two hundred on board of her, that I may by that Means ſtill reſerve ſome Room in her Hold, in caſe there ſhould be more Faſcines, *&c.* than the Hoſpital Ships will conveniently take in, and have deſired that one Month's more Proviſions for two hundred Men may be immediately put on board her, where ſhe is; but in caſe that is not accompliſhed before ſhe arrives here, it ſhall be ready to be ſent on board from hence on their appearing.

I have received your's of the 21ſt. by the Meſſenger, with their Lordſhip's Directions. I ſhall immediately fit the *Jaſon*, which, with the Tonnage I have got here and the Tenders, I think I can venture to aſſure their Lordſhips will remove all the Difficulties I found here, without the *Cheſterfield*. Their Lordſhips may depend on my doing every Thing in my Power to forward this Service, and don't doubt but I ſhall have all in ſuch Readineſs as not to run the leaſt Riſque of a Delay, when the Tranſports from the Eaſtward come round. I am diſappointed in the Ships I mentioned in my Letter laſt Night to Lord *Anſon* from the *Mother-Bank*, and alſo in one out of this Harbour; but with the Tenders that I am fitting, I ſhall have enough to quiet the Minds of all. It blew ſo exceſſively hard Yeſterday, that I did not get back from the *Iſle*

of







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





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of Wight before Ten at Night, which is the Reaſon I could not diſpatch the Meſſenger till this Morning.

I am, *&c.* GEO. COCKBURNE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXIV. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* Edward Hawke *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Portſmouth, Auguſt 25th, 1757.

SIR,

I AM honoured with your Letter of the 23d Inſtant. As a Number of Tranſports more have been taken up at this Port by the Comptroller of the Navy, and the *Jaſon* Ship of War is fitted for the Reception of Soldiers; I hope there will be no Occaſion to put any on board the Ships of War, which are already ſufficiently weakened, by having two Battalions of raw undiſciplined Men in their Complements; but in caſe the Tranſports ſhould not be ſufficient for the Number of Troops, I ſhall, in Obedience to his Majeſty's Commands, accommodate the Remainder on board the Men of War.

I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,

ED. HAWKE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXV. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *and* Sir John Mordaunt, *dated* Whitehall, September 5*th*, 1757, *Four o'Clock in the Afternoon.*

SIR,

THE Wind having been fair for the Tranſports going to *Spithead*, ever ſince *Friday* Morning, I am to acquaint you, that his Majeſty expects, with Impatience, to hear that the Troops are embarked; but if, by any Delay, the Embarkation ſhould not be compleated, when this Letter reaches you, I am to ſignify to you the King's Pleaſure, that the moſt particular Diligence be employed in getting the Troops on board, and proceeding without the Loſs of a Moment

ment to the Execution of your Orders and Inſtructions, with regard to the Expedition under your Care.

His Majeſty being informed that ten Battalions, under the Orders of Sir *John Ligonier*, were all compleatly embarked at *Williamſtadt* within the Courſe of twenty-four Hours, in which they arrived at that Place; the King expects to hear, by the Return of this Meſſenger, that the Fleet *under your Command with the Troops on board*, have proceeded to Sea, in caſe the Wind permits, agreeable to your Orders and Inſtructions.

To Sir *John Mordaunt, with the Troops under your Command on board.*

I am, *&c.*

To Sir *Edward Hawke.* W. PITT.

P. S. The Meſſenger that carries this has my Orders to ſtay to bring an Account of the Fleet's Sailing.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXVI. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* Edward Hawke *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Ramilies *at* Spithead, September *6th*, 1757.

SIR,

AT half paſt five this Morning I received, by Expreſs, your Letter of the 5th Inſtant, ſignifying his Majeſty's Directions to uſe the utmoſt Diligence in embarking the Troops, and getting to Sea.

As I could not doubt of my Letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, by Expreſs on *Sunday* Morning, being immediately communicated to you, I ſhould have expected, that before your's was ſent, his Majeſty would have been fully ſatisfied that I needed no Spur in the Execution of his Orders.

As the Wind was fair here on *Saturday*, I ordered an Officer with ſix Cutters out to cruize for the Tranſports, with poſitive Directions not to come to at *Spithead*, but proceed directly to *Cowes*. Soon after they appeared in Sight on *Sunday* Morning, I diſpatched an Officer to acquaint Sir *John Mordaunt*, with their Arrival,

rival, that every Thing might be ready. As there was but little Wind all Day on *Sunday*, but few of them reached *Cowes* that Night, and proving but little Wind on *Monday* Morning, I ſent Boats to tow the *Jaſon* down, with two Boats from each Ship at *Spithead*, together with all the Boats from the Dock, and the ſix Cutters to aſſiſt in the Embarkation. One Brigade was embarked Yeſterday, as the other will be by Noon To-day; ſo that the whole Time taken up in the Embarkation, from the Arrival of the Tranſports to this Day at Noon, will not exceed twenty-four Hours, tho' we have not the Advantage of Jetty-Heads, from whence the Troops could ſtep into the Tranſports.

Beſide, Sir, as they were detained ſo long in their Paſſage round, they were in Want of conſiderable Quantities of Proviſions, which to ſave Time I ſent to *Cowes* after them, while I watered, and victualled the Ordnance, and Horſe-ſhips here; the Horſe are embarked this Morning.

Give me Leave to add, that the Mortar was to be ſhipped on board the *Infernal* Bomb Veſſel; ſhe will be ready To-night; the Men of War which came round with them, were alſo in Want of Stores and ſome Proviſions.

The Squadron is now unmooring, and I only wait the Return of the Tranſports to *Spithead*, when I ſhall take the firſt Wind that offers to go to *St. Helens*, and if it ſhould prove favourable ſhall go to Sea immediately after.

Be ſo kind, Sir, as to take the Trouble to aſſure his Majeſty, that as I ever have, ſo more particularly on this Occaſion, I ſhall ſhew the greateſt Regard to his Orders. I am, *&c.*

ED. HAWKE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb. XXVII. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Portſmouth, September 6th, *Nine at Night.*

SIR,

I Had this Morning the Honour of your's of the 5th Inſtant, and can aſſure you, that not a Minute's Time has been loſt in embarking the Troops.

Though the firſt of the Tranſports did not arrive at *Cowes* 'till *Sunday* Evening, we began the Embarkation at Day-break the next Morning, and continued putting the Troops on board 'till after it was dark. We have followed the ſame Method To-day, and by that Means I have now the Pleaſure to acquaint you, that I finiſhed the Embarkation of the laſt Regiment at about ſix this Evening.

I beg you will do me the Favour, to mention to his Majeſty, that we were obliged to march the Troops and Baggage five Miles to the Place of Embarkation, and that we were then forced to put the Men in ſmall Boats, in which they were rowed above a Mile before they could embark in the Tranſports; whereas at *Williamſtadt* the Troops marched directly from the Quay into the Tranſports, without the leaſt Poſſibility of a Delay.

It is both my Duty and the Pride of my Heart, to execute with the utmoſt Diſpatch and Diligence the Orders his Majeſty has honoured me with, and I flatter myſelf a very ſhort Time will now ſhew it.

I am, *&c.* J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXVIII. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* Edward Hawke *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Ramilies *at* St. Helens, September 8th, 1757.

SIR,

A Calm obliged me on *Tueſday* to moor the Squadron again; Yeſterday at four in the Morning I began to unmoor again, and ſent an Officer to *Cowes*, to ſee none of the Tranſports were left behind. About

three in the Afternoon I got to this Place, and was obliged to come to, as they could not get out, dispatching Officers, who were all Night employed in ordering them to join me without Loss of Time.

Last Night arrived from the *Downs*, a Company of Lord *Effingham*'s Regiment, which had been embarked on board the *Norwich* at *Chatham*.

The Transports are all come down, and I am now under Way, with a moderate Breeze at E. N. E.

I am, *&c.* E. HAWKE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXIX. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* Edward Hawke *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Ramilies *at Sea*, September 10*th*, 1757.

SIR,

ON *Thursday* last, after I wrote to you, the Wind died away, which obliged me to come to again, till half an hour past Five: then a moderate Breeze about W. N. W. springing up, I made the Signal to weigh, and at Seven made Sail with all the Transports. On *Friday* we had contrary Winds till Evening, and this Morning I was joined by his Majesty's Ship *Essex*, by whom I send this. We have now a fresh Gale, with the Wind at N.N.E. *Portland* bears N.E. 11 Leagues. I am, *&c.*

ED. HAWKE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXX. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt *to Sir* Edward Hawke *and Sir* John Mordaunt, *dated* September 15*th*, 1757, *by the* Viper *Sloop*.

Sir *Edward Hawke*, and like Letter, *mutatis mutandis*, to Sir *John Mordaunt*.

SIR, *Whitehall, Sept.* 15th, 1757.

HIS Majesty, by his secret Instructions, dated the 5th Day of *August* last, having directed the Return of the *Fleet* under your Command, together with the *Land Forces on board*, "so as be in *England* at or about, as "near

Troops.

Fleet.

Forces and Ships. " near as may be, the End of *September*, un-
" leſs the Circumſtances of the *Ships and*
" *Forces* ſhall neceſſarily require their Return
" ſooner :" I am now to ſignify to you the King's Pleaſure, that you do not conſider the abovementioned Time, limited for your Return, as intended, in any Manner, to affect or interfere with the full Execution of the firſt and principal Object of the Expedition, namely, " Attempting, as far as ſhall be " found practicable, a Deſcent on the *French* Coaſt, " at or near *Rochefort*, in order to attack, if practi-" cable, and, by a vigorous Impreſſion, force that " Place; and to burn and deſtroy, to the utmoſt of " your Power, all Shipping, Docks, Magazines, " and Arſenals, that ſhall be found there, and exert " ſuch other Efforts as ſhall be judged moſt proper " for annoying the Enemy." And with regard to any other particular Attempt, which, agreeably to your Orders, you ſhall have commenced, and in the Execution whereof you ſhall be actually engaged, it is alſo his Majeſty's Pleaſure, that you do not deſiſt from, or break up the ſame, merely and ſolely on account of the Time limited for your Return by the Inſtructions abovementioned, but that, notwithſtanding the ſame, you do continue with the *Troops.* *Fleet*, during ſuch a farther Number of Days, as may afford a competent Time for the Completion of any Operation under the above Circumſtances: After which you are to take *Forces.* care to return with the *Fleet* under your *Fleet.* Command, and the *Forces on board*, in the Manner directed by your former Inſtructions. I am, *&c.*

W. PITT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXXI. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* Edward Hawke *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Ramilies, *in* Baſque-Road, Sept. 30*th*, 1757.

SIR,

ABOUT Seven o'Clock in the Evening of the 22d Inſtant, as I was ſtanding in between the Iſlands of *Rhé* and *Oleron* for *Baſque-Road*, I received his Majeſty's Orders, ſignified in your Letter of the 15th Inſtant by the *Viper*. Having before made the Diſpoſition for attacking the Iſle of *Aix* (a Step, in the general Opinion, neceſſary for ſecuring the landing of the Troops), at 10 in the Morning of the 23d, the Vice-Admiral, by my Order, weighed with the Tide of Flood, and ſtood towards it with his Diviſion, compoſed of the *Magnanime*, *Barfleur*, *Neptune*, *Torbay*, and *Royal William*, Frigates, Bomb-veſſels, Fireſhips, and Cutters. The *Magnanime* led: About Twelve the Fire began from the Fort with Shells and great Guns, and continued while our Ships approached, till about ten Minutes after One; when the *Magnanime* brought up within leſs than forty Yards of the Fort, where ſhe kept an inceſſant Fire for about thirty-five Minutes; as did the *Barfleur*, which brought up, about five Minutes after her, a-breaſt of the Fort. About three Quarters after One the Firing ceaſed, the Garriſon having ſtruck their Colours and ſurrendered. They had in the Fort eight Mortars of about 14 Inches Diameter, and thirty Guns, ſixteen of which were eighteen, and the Remainder about fourteen Pounders. The *Magnanime*, tho' damaged in her Rigging, Yards, and Maſts, yet had only two Soldiers killed, and eleven Men wounded. Of the Garriſon, which conſiſted of near ſix hundred Seamen and Soldiers, only one was killed, and ſeven or eight wounded.

On the Morning of the 23d, I obſerved a *French* Man of War, over the Land, to the S. E. of the Iſle of *Aix*. Being deſirous of deſtroying her, I directed Capt. *Byron*, of the *America*, to take with him the *Achilles*

Achilles and *Pluto* Fireſhips, and, as ſoon as the Red Diviſion ſhould begin to batter, go and deſtroy her. But the *French* flung their Guns overboard, cut their Cables, and otherwiſe lightening her, run up the *Charente*. It is ſaid ſhe was the *Prudent* of 74 Guns, bound for *Louisbourg*.

It having been thought neceſſary, in order to ſecure a ſafe Landing for the Troops, to ſound and reconnoitre the Shore of the Main, as ſoon as the Fort had ſurrendered, I directed Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*, with Captains *Denis*, *Douglas*, and *Buckle*, to perform that Service, and make their Report to me. It was the Afternoon of the 24th before they returned: A Copy of that Report accompanies this. After maturely conſidering it, I was of Opinion they might land; on which Sir *John Mordaunt* deſired a Council of War might be aſſembled to conſider of it. There it was granted by every body, that the Landing could be effected. In Confidence of their Judgment, and Knowledge of their own Profeſſion, we aſſented to their Reaſons for not proceeding to attempt taking *Rochefort* by Eſcalade. A Copy of the Reſult of that Council of War is here incloſed. He deſired a ſecond, which was aſſembled early on the Morning of the 28th: Herewith I ſend you the Reſult of it. Immediately the Diſpoſition was made for the Landing, under the Direction of Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*, and all the Captains of the Squadron. Part of the Troops were actually in the Boats, when I received a Letter from Mr. *Brodrick*, a Copy whereof I herewith tranſmit.

Laſt Night I applied to him, to know whether the General Officers of the Land Forces had any farther military Operations to propoſe, that I might not unneceſſarily detain the Squadron here. This Morning I received Sir *John*'s Anſwer, a Copy of which is here incloſed. It was the daily Expectation of their undertaking ſomething, which induced me to ſtay here ſo long. As I have now got their final Reſolution, I ſhall ſail for *England* To-morrow Morning.

Though, before I came here, this Place was repreſented as very difficult of Acceſs, and ſo narrow that Ships could not lye in Safety from the Forts, nay, the Pilots made many Baulks before we came in; yet I find it a ſafe ſpacious Road, in which all the Navy of *England*, Merchant-ſhips included, may ride without the leaſt Annoyance; and that a Squadron may, at any time, by laying here, prevent any Armament from *Rochefort*, and ruin all the *French* Trade to *Rhé*, *Oleron*, or the Continent, within theſe Iſlands.

I beg Leave to aſſure you, Sir, I have diſcharged my Duty to my King and Country with Fidelity, Diligence, and Integrity, and wiſh more could have been done for the Good of the Service.

The Pilot of the *Magnanime* has behaved like a Man of Bravery and Skill, and as ſuch I beg Leave to recommend him to you.

I am, *&c.*

ED. HAWKE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXXII. *Copy of a Report made to Sir* Edward Hawke *on board the* Ramilies, Sept. 24*th*, 1757, *by Rear-Admiral* Brodrick, *and others, incloſed in Sir* Edward Hawke's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *of the* 30*th* September, 1757.

In Purſuance of an Order from Sir *Edward Hawke*, Knight of the Bath, Admiral of the Blue Squadron of his Majeſty's Fleet, *&c.* dated the 23d *Sept.* 1757,

WE the underwritten went and ſounded the *French* Shore from *Rochelle* to Fort *Fouras*, and find as follows:

From the ſouth Point of the Entrance of *Rochelle* (on which Point there are 27 Guns mounted on Barbett) to the Point of the Angolin, we find it a rocky Shore,

Shore, and ſteep Clifts, with Shoals near two Miles off: From *Angolin* to *Chatiliallon*, we find a fair hard ſandy Beech, with a Flat lying off near two Miles, having but three Fathom at high Water at that Diſtance, but clear Ground; along which Beech are Sand-hills, about fifty Yards from the Top of high Water: On the Point of *Chatiliallon* are two Guns on Barbett, which can no ways annoy the landing of the Troops in the Bays of either Side of it; and off which Point runs a Riff of Rocks weſt two Miles, which are dry at low Water; and round the ſaid Point, about half a Mile to the Eaſtward, there is a ſmall ſandy Bay, near half a Mile long; and the Land over the ſaid Bay riſes with an eaſy Aſcent, about a Quarter of a Mile, to a Church or Convent, with a few Houſes near it. From the ſandy Bay, along to a ſquare Fort on the ſouth Part of the Bay, lies a long flat Mud, which is dry near two Miles at low Water.

It is our general Opinion, the Tranſports cannot come nearer to either of the foreſaid Bays (in order to land Troops) than a Mile and a half, as we found three Fathoms only at that Diſtance at high Water.

The ſquare Fort on the ſouth Side of the Bay, we could only ſee two Sides of: The Face to the North-weſt had nine Embrazures, and that to the North-eaſt only two.

Given under our Hands on board his Majeſty's Ship *Ramilies* in *Baſque-Road*, this 24 *Sept.* 1757.

THO. BRODRICK,
JAMES DOUGLAS,
PET. DENIS,
MATT. BUCKLE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXXIII. *Copy of a Council of War held on board the* Neptune, Sept. 25*th*, 1757, *inclosed in Sir* Edward Hawke's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Pitt *of the* 30*th* Septemb. 1757; *the ſame as the Original delivered by Sir* John Mordaunt, *ſoon after his Arrival, to Mr. Secretary* Pitt.

At a Council of War held on board his Majeſty's Ship Neptune, *at Anchor off the Iſle of* Aix, Sept. 25, 1757.

PRESENT,

Sir *Edward Hawke*, Knight of the Bath, Admiral and Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's Ships employed in the preſent Expedition.

Sir *John Mordaunt*, Knight of the Bath, Lieutenant-General of his Majeſty's Forces, and General and Commander in Chief of the Troops on the preſent Expedition.

Charles Knowles, Eſq; Vice-Admiral of the Red.

The Right Hon. Major-General *Henry Seymour Conway*.

Thomas Brodrick, Eſq; Rear-Admiral of the White.

Hon. Major-General *Edward Cornwallis*.

Captain *George Bridges Rodney*.

Colonel *George Howard*.

THE Fortifications and Iſland of *Aix*, belonging to the *French* King, having ſurrendered to his Majeſty's Arms, the Council proceeded to take into Conſideration the farther Steps proper to be taken, in Execution of his Majeſty's ſecret Inſtructions to Sir *Edward Hawke* and Sir *John Mordaunt*, Commanders in Chief of his Majeſty's Forces on the preſent Expedition; and the firſt Object being to determine, whether a proper Place could be found for landing the Troops, Sir *Edward Hawke* produced a Report by Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*, and the Captains *Douglas*, *Denis*, and *Buckle*, whom he had ſent to ſound and reconnoitre the Coaſt, from *La Rochelle* to the Point of *Fouras*, near the Embouchure of the River *Charente*, which Report is hereunto annexed.

The

The Council having taken the ſaid Report into Conſideration, and examined the Pilots, it appears that there are but two Landing-places; and that the Troops could not be reimbarked from either of them in bad Weather, the Swell of the Sea making ſo great a Surf on the Shore, that no Boats would be able to approach it to take the Troops off; (the ableſt Pilot having informed the Council, that he had been at Anchor ſeven Weeks in this Road, and not a Boat been able to paſs or repaſs.) And it likewiſe appears to the Council, that in caſe the Troops ſhould be overpowered by ſuperior Numbers of the Enemy, they could have no Protection from the Cannon of the Fleet, the ſhoal Water preventing their coming within Gun-ſhot.

The Probability of Succeſs in the Attempt againſt *Rochefort*, in caſe the Landing was effected, being then taken into Conſideration, Lieutenant-Colonel *Clarke*, chief Engineer, was called in; and being aſked his Opinion, declared, That when he ſaw the Place in the Year 1754, he thought no Place was more capable of being taken by Aſſault; what Alteration may have been made in the Place ſince, he has not ſufficient Information to judge: That he does not imagine any regular Attack was intended againſt that or any other Place, the ſmall Quantity of Artillery we have not being ſent on that Plan. Being aſked, if the Ditch were flowed with Water, whether he ſhould then think it practicable to take the Place by Eſcalade, ſaid, he thought not; but that when he ſaw the Ditch, it did not appear to him capable of being flowed.

Monſ. *de Bonneville*, Volunteer, being aſked what he knew of *Rochefort*, ſaid, that he was there about nine Years ago; that the Ramparts were of Earth, and that there are Sluices there, by which they can flow the Ditch, and that it was full of Water all round when he was there.

The Pilot of the *Neptune* being called in, ſaid, that he had been very frequently at *Rochefort*; that he com-

commanded a ſmall Veſſel there many Years; that they have Sluices near the Hoſpital, by which they can fill the Ditch with Water; that they raiſe them ſometimes to cleanſe the Ditch, and that he has ſeen Water in it quite round the Town.

The Informations of ſome *French* Priſoners were then produced, confirming the ſame; as alſo, that they had been working on the Fortifications there for ſome time paſt.

The Intelligence received from ſeveral neutral Veſſels, ſpoke with on the Paſſage, was alſo produced, declaring, that the *French* had been for ſome time in Expectation of a Deſcent from the *Engliſh* in thoſe Parts: All which being taken into Conſideration, together with the long Detention of the Troops in the Iſle of *Wight*, and our meeting with contrary Winds, Fogs, and Calms, upon our Paſſage; the ſeveral Informations received of Troops aſſembled in the Neighbourhood, and the great Improbability of finding the Place unprovided, or of ſurpriſing it, or conſequently ſucceeding in an Enterprize founded on the Plan of an Aſſault or Eſcalade merely, and the Uncertainty of a ſecure Retreat for the Troops, if landed; the Council are unanimouſly of Opinion, that ſuch an Attempt is neither adviſable nor practicable.

EDWARD HAWKE,
J. MORDAUNT,
CHARLES KNOWLES,
H. SEYMOUR CONWAY,
THOMAS BRODRICK,
EDWARD CORNWALLIS,
G. B. RODNEY,
G. HOWARD.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb. XXXIV. *Copy of a Council of War held on board the* Ramilies, Sept. 28*th*, 1757, *incloſed in Sir* Edward Hawke's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *of the* 30*th* Sept. 1757; *the ſame as the Original delivered by Sir* John Mordaunt, *ſoon after his Arrival, to Mr. Secretary* Pitt.

At a Council of War held on board his Majeſty's Ship Ramilies, *in* Baſque-Road, *this* 28*th* Sept. 1757.

PRESENT,

Sir *Edward Hawke*, Knight of the Bath, Admiral and Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's Ships employed on the preſent Expedition.

Sir *John Mordaunt*, Knight of the Bath, Lieutenant-General of his Majeſty's Forces, and Commander in Chief of the Troops employed on the preſent Expedition.

Charles Knowles, Eſq; Vice-Admiral of the Red.

The Right Hon. Major-General *Henry Seymour Conway*.

Thomas Brodrick, Eſq; Rear-Admiral of the White.

Hon. Major-General *Edward Cornwallis*.

Captain *George Bridges Rodney*.

Colonel *George Howard*.

THE Council of War being aſſembled, at the Deſire of Sir *John Mordaunt*, proceeded to take under Conſideration, whether it is adviſable to land the Troops, to attack the Forts leading to and upon the Mouth of the River *Charente*; and after mature Deliberation are unanimouſly of Opinion, that it is adviſable to land the Troops for that Purpoſe, with all poſſible Diſpatch.

ED. HAWKE,
J. MORDAUNT,
CH. KNOWLES,
H. SEYMOUR CONWAY,
THO. BRODRICK,
ED. CORNWALLIS,
GEO. BRIDGES RODNEY,
G. HOWARD.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb. XXXV. *Copy of a Letter from Rear-Admiral* Brodrick *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Achilles, Tueſday *at One in the Morning*, *incloſed in Sir* Edward Hawke's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *of the 30th of* September, 1757.

SIR,

I Have prepared all the Boats, with proper Officers, to land the Troops, agreeable to your Order; but am to acquaint you, that the Generals are come to a Reſolution not to land To-night, and to wait till Day light, when they can have a full View of the Ground where they are to land. I am, *&c.*

THO. BRODRICK.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXXVI. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Ramilies, Thurſday *Evening*, September 29, 1757, *incloſed in Sir* Edward Hawke's *Letter to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *of the 30th of* September, 1757.

SIR,

UPON Receipt of your Letter, I talked it over with the other Land-Officers who were of our Councils of War, and we all agree in returning directly to England. I am, Sir, *&c.*

J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXXVII. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Ramilies, Rade de Baſque, Sept. 30, 1757.

SIR,

LAST Thurſday I had the Honour of your's of the 15th Inſtant, and am pleaſed with thinking, that, before the Receipt of it, we had judged right in reſolving to attack *l'Iſle de Aix*, though it could not poſſibly be done without breaking, in ſome meaſure,

ſure, into his Majeſty's Orders, in regard to the Time of our returning to England.

We took *l'Iſle de Aix* on the 23d; and as Sir *Edward Hawke* will ſend a particular Account of the Affair, I ſhall trouble you with very few Words on that Head.

When Vice-Admiral *Knowles* was ſent with his Diviſion to attack the Fort, I ſent Major-General *Conway* with the *Buffs*, *Bentinck*'s, and the *King*'s Regiments, to be ready to land, whenever the Admiral thought it might be of any Uſe.

The Fort did not hold out above half an Hour after Capt. *Howe* had given his firſt Broadſide, which he did not do till he was within fifty Yards of it.

I am quite unhappy that the great national Object, the taking of *Rochefort*, was not at this Period practicable; and what adds to my Unhappineſs is, that the King ſo ſtrongly ordered it. But when his Majeſty reads the particular Events and Circumſtances, which are ſtrictly ſtated in the Council of War, I flatter myſelf he will not be diſſatisfied with our Proceedings.

Whilſt the Fortifications of the Fort on the *Iſle d'Aix* were blowing up, we thought it right to make ſome Attempt, and agreed on Landing and Attacking the Forts leading to and upon the River *Charente*. Orders were accordingly given on the 28th, for our landing the ſame Night with the whole Army. At One in the Morning, Rear-Admiral *Broderick*, with moſt of the Captains, and all the Sea-Officers of every Kind, with all the Boats that could be got, were ready to aſſiſt, and moſt of the Troops for the firſt Embarkation were on board; unfortunately, ſuch a high Wind ſprung up from the Shore, that all the Sea-Officers gave their Opinion that the Landing ſhould not be attempted: That the Boats muſt be towed ſo very ſlowly; the Tranſport Boats, by Reports to me, could not ſome of them make any Way at all; That it would be Day-light before the firſt Embarkation could poſſibly be landed; and all agreed

agreed it would be ſix Hours before that Body of Troops could be ſupported by the Landing of a ſecond Embarkation: Add to this, that the Ships could not come near enough to help to cover the Landing, and the Garriſon of *Rochelle* was within two Leagues.

Under theſe Circumſtances, and the ſtrong Repreſentation of the Sea-Officers, the General Officers unanimouſly agreed to ſend the Troops back again to their Tranſports.

The Wind being fair, and the Works near blown up, I had next Morning a Note from Sir *Edward Hawke*, letting me know, that if the General Officers had no further military Operations to propoſe, conſiderable enough to authoriſe his detaining the Squadron longer here, he intended to proceed with it to *England*, without Loſs of Time. I communicated this Note to the Land-Officers that compoſed our Councils of War; and, upon weighing every Circumſtance, we all agreed to return to *England*.

I greatly grieve that I muſt report to his Majeſty, that ſo fine a Body of Troops has done nothing. But I am not conſcious that any commanding Officer (however more able than myſelf) could have done more under our Circumſtances. I am, *&c.*

J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

MINUTES of a Council of War assembled on board his Majesty's Ship *Ramilies*, in *Basque* Road, this 28th of *Sept.* 1757.

Numb. XXXVIII. *Copy of Minutes of a Council of War held on board the* Ramilies, Sept. 28, 1757, *and delivered by Sir* John Mordaunt, *soon after his Arrival, to Mr. Secretary* Pitt.

PRESENT,

Sir *Edward Hawke*, Knight of the Bath, President.

Sir *John Mordaunt*, Knight of the Bath, *&c.*
Right Hon. *Henry Seymour Conway*, Major-General
Hon. *Edward Cornwallis*, Major-General
Col. *George Howard*
Charles Knowles, Esq; Vice Admiral of the Red
Thomas Brodrick, Esq; Rear-Admiral of the White
Capt. *Geo. Bridges Rodney.*

THE Council, in order to determine whether the Forts, leading to and upon the Mouth of the River *Charente*, were open and capable of being attacked by Land, proceeded to examine,

1. Lieutenant-Colonel *Wolfe*, who declares, that with regard to Fort *Fouras*, it is his Opinion that it is not a strong Place, seeming to be principally fortified towards the Sea, yet he saw People at Work on the Land Side: That if our Troops could come at the *Barbette* Battery by it, it might be of great Use in taking the Fort, provided there was proper Ammunition for that Purpose. He further gives it as his Opinion, that Fort *Fouras* cannot be taken but by Artillery or Escalade.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel *Clarke*, who says he could make no kind of Judgment of Fort *Fouras* on the Land Side by the Help of a Telescope, the only Method he has ever heard of observing it.

3. A *French* Prisoner, who says, Fort *Fouras* is a circular Fort; upon the Back of it, towards the Land, there

there was no Ditch, when he saw it three Years ago: That it had twenty-four Pieces of Cannon, mounted towards the Sea, and Embrazures for Guns towards the Land: That Fort *la Pointe* is like *Fouras*, circular, and has twenty-two Pieces of Cannon; on the East Side, towards the Land, it has a Wall like that of *Fouras*: That the Landing in the Bay of *Chatelaillon* is the best Landing of any Place here; and that when landed, and you get upon the *Rochefort* Road, it is a fine open Country: "That on *Friday* "Morning of the 23d Instant, he was in Fort *Fou-* "*ras*; that there was but twenty-two or twenty-four "Guns in it, and not above fifty Men of all Kinds: "That there are much about the same Number of "Guns in Fort *la Pointe*; and that both Forts are "inclosed by a Wall, in much the same manner to- "wards the Land."

The Council having maturely considered the Evidence, Sir *John Mordaunt* declared he was of Opinion, that something further should be attempted, and that he would give his Orders accordingly that Moment, if any, meaning the General Officers of the Troops, would say it was adviseable.—Vice-Admiral *Knowles* declared he had received great Light from the Persons examined, and therefore thought something ought to be attempted.

Major-General *Conway* declared for the Attempt, merely from his own Opinion, without Regard to the Evidences.

Sir *Edward Hawke*, appealing to every Member of the Council for the Truth of what he said, declared, that he was now of the same Opinion, which he had given both before and at the Council of War of the 25th, that the Landing could be effected: That the Troops ought to be landed for some farther Attempt, which was alone Matter of Consideration with the General Officers of the Troops, he, not taking upon him to be a Judge of Land Operations, but would, from his Confidence in their Abilities and Skill in their own Profession, readily assent to any Resolution

they

they ſhould come to, and aſſiſt them to the utmoſt of his Power. This being ſettled, after ſome Debate, Sir *John Mordaunt*, Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*, and Captain *Rodney*, withdrew.

The Council of War being re-aſſembled, and the Queſtion put,

Whether it is adviſeable to land the Troops, to attack the Forts leading to and upon the Mouth of the River *Charente?*

YES.	NO.
Col. *George Howard*, Capt. *Geo. Bridges Rodney*, Rear-Admiral *Brodrick*, Right Hon. *Hen. Seymour Conway*, Vice-Admiral *Knowles*, Sir *John Mordaunt*, Sir *Edward Hawke*,	Hon. Major-General *Edward Cornwallis*; but afterwards acquieſced with the Majority.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XXXIX. *Copy of a Letter from* Sir John Mordaunt *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Ramilies, Oct. 4, 1757.

SIR,

I Have the Honour to inform you, that we are now got into the Channel; and, as it is doubtful how long we may be before we reach *Portſmouth*, as the Wind now ſtands, I think it my Duty to trouble you with this Expreſs.

I muſt beg the Favour to know his Majeſty's Orders in Regard to the Deſtination and Quartering of the Troops. I muſt alſo deſire Orders, whether I am to ſtay at *Portſmouth* till the Troops have all marched out of that Town, or, whether upon Landing, I am immediately to come to *London*, and make my Report to his Majeſty, and leave the Diſembarking and Marching of the Regiments to the two Major-Generals.

As the Reſolution to ſail for *England*, and the Diſpatch of the Expreſs to you, were of the ſame Day, I flatter myſelf you will make Allowances for the Hurry I was in, and excuſe the Inaccuracies in the Letter I had the Honour to ſend to you, dated the 30th of *September*; in looking over the Copy of it, I ſee I have not ſtated, in a clear Light, the Article relating to the Gentlemen of the Sea Service; and I think it my Duty to explain, that after our talking over the Affair together, it was the General Officers ſaying it would be neceſſary to land before Day, that occaſioned the Gentlemen of the Sea Service to adviſe againſt the attempting it that Morning.

I cannot help repeating my Concern that the Affair of *Rochefort* did not ſucceed, and I ſhall be doubly unhappy, if, upon reading the Council of War, you do not think we acted right. I am, *&c.*

J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XL. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Portſmouth, Oct. 6, 1757.

SIR,

I Think it my Duty to inform you, by my Aid de Camp, that the Fleet came to an Anchor this Evening at St. *Helen's*, and that moſt of the Tranſports are already got to *Spithead*.

As it will be of the greateſt Advantage to the Troops to diſembark ſoon; and as I am doubtful whether or not the Letter I had the Honour to ſend you, by a Ship ordered to *Plymouth*, to be forwarded by Expreſs, can have ſo ſoon come to your Hands, I think it my Duty to ſend you a Duplicate of it.

I muſt keep the Troops on board, till I receive his Majeſty's further Commands; and am, *&c.*

J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb.

Numb. XLI. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt *to Sir* Edward Hawke, *dated* Oct. 7, 1757.

SIR,

YEsterday Morning I received the Favour of your Letter of the 30th paſt, which was immediately laid before the King; and having this Day had an Account from Sir *John Mordaunt*, that the Troops are arrived at *Portſmouth*, I am commanded to ſignify to you his Majeſty's Pleaſure, that you do give immediate Orders for Diſembarking at *Southampton* the five following Battalions, *viz.* the Earl of *Home's*, Lord *George Bentinck's*, firſt Battalion of Lieutenant-General *Wolfe's*, firſt Battalion of Colonel *Kingſley's*, and firſt Battalion of Colonel *Howard's*; and that the five other Battalions, *viz.* the Earl of *Loudoun's*, Colonel *Amherſt's*, Colonel *Hodgſon's*, Colonel *Brudenel's*, and the firſt Battalion of Major-General *Cornwallis's*, be diſembarked at *Portſmouth*. With Regard to the two Battalions of Lieutenant-General *Stuart's* and Earl of *Effingham's*, which have ſerved on board the Fleet, it is the King's Pleaſure, that they be diſembarked at *Portſmouth* or *Chatham*, according as the Men of War may be ordered to either of thoſe Places. I am, *&c.*

W. PITT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XLII. *Copy of a Letter from Mr. Secretary* Pitt *to Sir* John Mordaunt, *dated* Oct. 7, 1757.

SIR,

YEsterday Morning I received the Favour of your Letter of the 30th paſt, and this Morning that dated the 4th Inſtant, in the Channel; and, at One o'Clock this Afternoon, I was alſo favoured with one of the 6th Inſtant, by your Aid de Camp, from *Portſmouth:* All which were immediately laid before the King. And I am to acquaint you, that his Majeſty is pleaſed to permit you to return to *London* immediately, in order to make a Report of your Proceedings, leaving at *Portſmouth* one of the Major-Generals,

to

to ſuperintend the Diſembarkation of the Troops; and the King is pleaſed to leave it to you to appoint, which of the two Major-Generals you ſhall judge moſt proper for that Service; the other being at Liberty to return to *London* with you. I am, *&c.* W. PITT.

P. S. I ſend you incloſed a Copy of a Letter I have wrote to Sir *Edward Hawke*, by which you will ſee the Orders his Majeſty has thought proper to give him for diſembarking the Troops. You will acquaint the Major-General, whom you ſhall leave to ſuperintend the Diſembarkation, that he may return to *London*, as ſoon as that Service ſhall be completed.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XLIII. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* Edward Hawke *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Ramilies *at* Spithead, Oct. 8, 1757, 1 P. M.

SIR,

I Have the Honour of your Letter of Yeſterday's Date, ſignifying his Majeſty's Orders for the Diſembarkation of the Troops. As I have Permiſſion to come to *London*, I have directed Vice-Admiral *Knowles* to put theſe Orders in Execution as ſoon as the Weather will permit, it blowing very hard at preſent. I am, *&c.* ED. HAWKE.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

Numb. XLIV. *Copy of a Letter from Sir* John Mordaunt *to Mr. Secretary* Pitt, *dated* Portſmouth, Oct. 8, 1757.

SIR,

I Had this Morning the Honour of your Letter; and, in conſequence of it, ſhall ſet out for *London* To-morrow Morning early, and propoſe myſelf the Pleaſure of paying my Reſpects to you on *Monday* Morning. I am, *&c.* J. MORDAUNT.

A true Copy. Robert Wood.

FINIS.